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DECIDING FOR OTHERS: 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 
Patricia Mary Powell 
1987 
This paper addresses two questions within contemporary 
medical ethics. First, how do we make treatment decisions for 
seriously ill, incompetent patients? Second, how ought we to 
make these decisions? Most medical ethicists analyze these 
questions using the legal model, and therefore strive above all 
to protect autonomy and the patient's rights. This approach 
fails to incorporate the concerns of many physicians and family 
members, who are concerned not only with rights, but also with 
such subjective factors as pain, and the patient's sense of 
relation to the community. Physicians, however, have often been 
unable to formulate decisions which are clear and principled, and 
yet incorporate this subjective information. 
By turning away from the legal model, with its ethics of 
rights, and toward the ethics of responsibility, we can derive 
principles which will aid physicians and families in making 
decisions for incompetent patients. This new ethical framework 
allows us to describe more accurately the relevant factors in 
decisions for incompetent patients. In addition, the ethics of 
responsibility shows us how to improve decisions in this crucial 
area of medical ethics. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
This thesis will attempt to shed light on two difficult 
questions within medical ethics. First, how do we make treatment 
decisions for seriously ill, incompetent patients? Second, how 
ought we to make these decisions? 
I do not pretend to ask these questions in an entirely 
neutral manner, for they are prompted by certain troubling 
observations. Physicians and members of the public criticize the 
legal reasoning used in analyzing these decisions as being poorly 
suited to the task. The adversarial nature of legal proceedings, 
as well as the very neutrality and objectivity for which the law 
strives, fail to address the often subjective and emotional 
factors which may be pivotal in these dilemmas. 
Physicians, who may sense keenly the short-comings of the 
legal model, are themselves unable to articulate clearly more 
appropriate principles for making these decisions. Confronted 
with the pain of patients and their families, and yet taxed by 
their perceived duty to pursue a cure with ever slimmer hopes of 
success, physicians flounder, failing to reconcile conflicting 
obligations. Thus we witness what doctors and lawyers have both 
identified as a persistent inability among physicians to name the 
principles by which they arrive at treatment decisions for 
incompetent patients. 
Medical ethics ought to be a source of help to the 
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physician, by articulating and defining principles for decision¬ 
making. However, ethics often falls short of this goal. The main 
voice in the literature of medical ethics today emphasizes unduly 
the language and concepts of the law. The principles most 
frequently upheld in guiding decisions for all patients, 
including incompetent ones, are directed at preserving autonomy 
and patients’ rights. Such concepts are cruelly inappropriate 
when applied to patients like Karen Quinlan, who are wholly 
unable to exercise autonomy or to assert any right. And yet 
without a trace of irony, the removal of a respirator from Karen 
Quinlan is described by one eminent ethicist as a "triumph of 
autonomy." There is a disquieting gap between the way many 
ethicists describe decision-making for incompetent patients, and 
how it is experienced by physicians and family members. Not 
surprisingly, the answers supplied by the ethicist seem often not 
to match the questions asked by families and doctors. 
Is there any way to improve the fashion in which these 
decisions are formed? I believe there is, by turning away from 
the legal model, with its emphasis on rights, autonomy, and 
confrontation. The point is not, however, for doctors to 
chastise lawyers for the adverse impact of law on medicine, nor 
to suggest that these decisions are made excellently when doctors 
are left on their own. Indeed, the case which we shall examine 
most closely and criticize most harshly, that of John Storar, was 
one in which the courts sided with the physicians, to the 
disadvantage of the patient. In fact, doctors too often assign 
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elsewhere the blame for medicine's inadequacies. It is we who 
must strive to articulate our responsibilities in a way that 
incorporates the kindness and humanity that exemplifies medicine 
at its best, while delineating principles which are clear, and 
accessible to public discussion. If we cannot do this, it is 
with ourselves we must find fault. 
Such principles, at once kind yet clear, can be subsumed 
within the ethics of responsibility, which contrasts with the 
legal system's ethics of rights. In describing the ethics of 
responsibility, I hope to provide a view of medical decision¬ 
making that is more accurate than the legal description, in that 
it acknowledges the impact of such subjective factors as emotion 
and pain. But beyond this sharper picture of reality, I hope 
also to indicate the direction we may take in striving for an 
ideal. That ideal cannot be realized, however, unless physicians 
accept responsibility for promoting among themselves clear 
thinking on these painful issues. In addition, we must help the 
public understand more fully the limitations of medicine at the 
end of life, and the distinction between decisions which are 
purely technical, and those which require ethical and moral 
evaluation. 
The Plan of the Thesis 
In order to answer our two questions about decision-making 
for incompetent patients, we will proceed according to the 
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following plan. In Chapter II, we will set the questions in 
their historical context by briefly reviewing major forces that 
have shaped medical ethics. In particular, we will look at the 
emergence of autonomy as a central concept in reasoning about 
medical dilemmas. In chapter III, we will examine some of the 
flaws of this standard approach, especially as it applies to 
incompetent patients. Then, in chapters IV and V, we will 
examine the work of two psychologists, Lawrence Kohlberg and 
Carol Gilligan, and apply some of their insights about moral 
development to the context of medical ethics. 
The Ethics of Responsibility, the subject of chapter VI, is 
an effort to formulate a new ethical model, which will respond to 
criticisms of the old model and incorporate concepts not 
expressed within the traditional framework. We then discuss, in 
chapter VII, a particular legal case involving the withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment in an incompetent patient. We 
investigate how the court decided, and how one might have 
improved the outcome by reasoning within the ethics of 
responsibility. Chapter VIII summarizes conclusions and 
recommendations. 
Before we begin our investigation, let us provide a few 
ground rules about the use of language in medical ethics. There 
are a few words that persistently arise in discussions such as 
the one we are about to undertake. Examples include words like 
"terminal," "heroic," and "extraordinary." Unfortunately, 
definitions of these words vary from author to author, making 
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their interpretation impossible. Rather than provide a set of 
definitions for this paper, I have followed the example of some 
recent writers, and have attempted to avoid these terms as much 
as possible. In some instances, this effort has meant the 
addition of explanatory phrases in place of one of these ill- 
defined words. I ask the reader to bear with me in this effort to 
attain greater clarity. 
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Chapter II: The Historical Context 
The problem of making treatment decisions for incompetent 
patients has attracted an extraordinary amount of attention in 
the last decade. No doubt the reason lies in part in the great 
number of life-sustaining and life-saving treatments which are 
newly available. Fifty years ago, physicians and families chose 
among relatively few possible interventions for seriously ill 
patients. Since that time, intensive care units, respirators, 
defibrillators, and a rapidly expanding array of antibiotics and 
ingenious means for delivering nutrition have become commonplace. 
One reason that the problem has become more acute, therefore, is 
that there are more interventions to argue about. 
However, the impact of new technology cannot fully explain 
why the debate stirs such passion. New medical treatments have 
always been proposed, and physicians have always, more or less 
heatedly, debated the merits of new and old regimens. Certainly 
this was true in 1871 when George Eliot wrote Middlemarch. in 
which the ambitious young Doctor Lydgate provokes the ire of his 
peers with such radical innovations as the stethoscope.1 Thus, 
it is not just new technology that makes this problem 
contemporary. In any era physicians and families could have 
publicly debated the merits of continuing or withdrawing 
1 George Eliot, Middlemarch. Middlesex, England, Penguin 
Books, 1985, (1871), p.371. 
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therapies, yet they did not. What has changed, then, is that 
doctors and families do in fact debate these decisions, and in an 
unprecedentedly acrimonious and public fashion. 
When one person is granted sole and unquestioned power to 
make a decision, there is little room for public debate about 
that decision. Historically, doctors felt that such exclusive 
decision-making power was not only their prerogative, but their 
obligation. This belief reflects an ancient tradition within 
medical ethics which emphasizes a benevolent protectiveness of 
doctors toward their patients. 
In the Hippocratic Oath doctors swear to protect patients 
from harm and injustice, and to work for the benefit of the sick, 
as defined by the doctor. No reference is made to the 
possibility of a disagreement between doctor and patient as to 
what constitutes the patient's best interest. The Hippocratic 
Oath springs entirely from the doctor's point of view. It not 
only does not admit the possibility of argument, it ignores the 
existence of the patient's opinion. Thus, within the Hippocratic 
tradition, doctors are active, and patients are passive; doctors 
are subjects, while patients are objects. They are objects to be 
treated with the utmost care, but objects nonetheless. 
This benevolent arrogance was perpetuated in more recent 
medical codes of ethics. Thomas Percival's Medical Ethics. 
published in 1803, reaffirmed the physician's obligations of 
beneficence and nonmaleficence, without discussing the idea of 
the patient's independent point of view. For instance, Percival 
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concurred with the practice of not revealing to patients their 
unfavorable prognoses unless "absolutely necessary." Doctors 
were to decide what information patients ought to know. The AMA, 
when it adopted its first code in 1847, drew largely from 
Percival's statements, although adding a few phrases designed to 
underscore the physician's authority.2 
This tradition was biased toward the doctor's viewpoint and 
allowed physicians unfettered authority in exchange for 
benevolent supervision. It was bound to run afoul of modern 
legal notions of individual liberty and self-determination. 
Thus, the law entered the realm of medical ethics, and became a 
new shaping force. 
Although earlier examples exist, two celebrated instances of 
the legal influence on medical ethics occurred in this country in 
the early twentieth century. In 1905, Mrs. Parmelia Davis, 
suffering from chronic epilepsy, was referred to Dr. Pratt, an 
authority on the subject. Dr. Pratt determined that a total 
hysterectomy was the treatment of choice for Mrs. Davis' 
epilepsy, and then performed the operation without ever 
explaining its nature to Mrs. Davis. When she learned that her 
uterus and ovaries had been removed, she sued, not because the 
treatment was inappropriate, but because she had not been warned. 
The doctor explained that he had not informed her because he 
2 Both Percival's Medical Ethics and the AMA code are 
discussed in: Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. 
New York, Macmillan, Inc., 1984, p.17. Katz provides an 
excellent analysis not only of the evolution of codes of medical 
ethics, but also of informed consent. 
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"wished her to come to the operating room without violence." The 
doctor claimed that by consenting to treatment, the patient 
implicitly gave her consent to any procedure the physician deemed 
necessary. The court disagreed. Indeed, the judge found that to 
operate without permission was a violation of the patient's 
bodily integrity3. 
The case of Schloendorff v. The Society of New York 
Hospital, in 1914, concerned another instance of an operation 
performed without permission. In this case, Mrs. Schloendorff 
had agreed to a pelvic examination under anesthesia, while 
insisting that no operation should take place. Despite her 
previously stated wishes, the physician proceeded to remove a 
fibroid tumor from the uterus. In his decision, Justice Cardozo 
produced the famous statement: "Every human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body..."4 This decision provided a springboard that 
helped clearly establish in common law the competent patient's 
right to refuse treatment. 
Such judgments established more than a single right; they 
changed the vocabulary of medical ethics. The new language of 
medical ethics became the language of law, i.e., the language of 
rights. The change was more than just semantic, however, for it 
marked the entrance of law as a new force in medical ethics. It 
also introduced a profound tension between two viewpoints in 
3 Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App.161 (1905). 
4 Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125 (1914). 
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medical ethics. One, older and more intrinsically medical, 
reflects the Hippocratic tradition of benevolent despotism. The 
second, a newer legal viewpoint, emphasizes the rights of 
individuals. 
Autonomy's Rise 
The legal emphasis on individual rights grew out of the 
political philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
In particular, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant influences the 
notion of individual rights in contemporary medical ethics. Kant 
based his ethical system on the categorical imperative, also 
known as the principle of respect for persons. One version of 
this principle is as follows: "Act so as to treat man, in your 
own person as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, 
never merely as a means."5 Persons deserve respect in so far as 
they are rational beings whose will is autonomous. Thus 
autonomy, derived from the Greek autos (self) and nomos (rule), 
is exhibited by one who formulates his own moral laws, and is not 
constrained by factors such as fear or appetite6. A person's 
own desires and emotions are seen as external influences on the 
will, which is defined by Kant as a purely rational capacity. 
Autonomy, based entirely in reason, is for Kant the basis of 
respect for persons. All other rights and privileges stem from 
5 Immanuel Kant, "Metaphysical Foundations of Morals," in 
The Philosophy of Kant, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich, New York, 
Modern Library, 1949, (1785), p.178. 
6 Ibid.. p.187. 
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this central concept of autonomy. 
A different view of autonomy emerges from John Stuart Mill's 
writings in the nineteenth century. Mill stresses freedom of 
action, rather than of the will alone. He insists that 
autonomous persons must be free to choose courses of action which 
may run counter to societal conventions, as long as other persons 
are not harmed. In defining the relation of individuals to the 
community, Mill is concerned primarily with what society may 
rightly compel individuals to do. He summarizes the individual's 
obligations to society thus: 1) to act so as not to injure the 
rights of others, and 2) to bear a share of the labor necessary 
to defend society from injury and molestation.7 Thus, Mill 
emphasizes negative freedoms; autonomy becomes the right to be 
let alone. 
For the purposes of this essay, we will define autonomy as 
the freedom of the individual to act on his moral beliefs without 
the physical or psychological constraints of others8. This 
modern definition of autonomy, based on that of Beauchamp and 
Childress, differs from Kant's in that it allows a role for non- 
rational factors in autonomous choice. The statement is phrased 
so that actions influenced by emotion could be considered 
autonomous. Beauchamp and Childress define as external only that 
7 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. Middlesex, England, Penguin 
Books, 1976, (1859), pp.141-2. 
8 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of 




which comes from other persons, whereas Kant defines as external 
those forces within the person which are not wholly rational. 
According to all these definitions, however, autonomy is the 
basis of respect for persons, and for the rights which are 
contingent upon this respect. 
Autonomy has played a crucial role in the development of 
medical ethics in the twentieth century, not just for patients, 
but for research subjects as well. The importance of autonomy 
was quite evident from the codes of medical ethics which emerged 
from the trial of Nazi doctors at Nuremberg. Shocked by 
experiments conducted on prisoners, physicians and others were 
driven to elucidate the necessary ethical conditions for research 
on human subjects. The first of the basic principles enumerated 
was that "the voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential."9 The code then stipulates that consent is 
not voluntary unless the person may "exercise free power of 
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, 
deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of 
constraint or coercion...."10 In addition, consent must be based 
on knowledge of the experiment's nature and purpose, and any 
hazards it might entail for the subject. 
It is of historical interest to note that the Nuremberg 
Code was not the first attempt to formulate ethical guidelines 





for human experimentation. Indeed, legally binding standards 
were in effect in Germany during the Third Reich. These rules 
specifically require informed consent for both "New Therapy" 
and "Human Experimentation." Although informed consent might be 
waived for new therapy "in urgent cases," no such exceptions 
existed for non-therapeutic experimentation. Thus, "without 
consent, non-therapeutic research [was] under no circumstances 
permissible.1,11 Although the Nuremberg Code focussed public 
attention on the need to clarify and enforce codes of medical 
ethics, it was not, although it is often described as, the first 
attempt to accomplish this task. 
The World Medical Assembly revised and expanded the concepts 
of the Nuremberg Code, adopting new guidelines in 1964. The new 
code continued to stress the importance of autonomy and thus of 
informed consent. Specific injunctions were included that 
potential subjects be: 
adequately informed of the aims, methods, anticipated 
benefits and potential hazards of the study and the 
discomfort it may entail. He or she should be informed that 
he or she is at liberty to abstain from participation in the 
study...[or] withdraw...consent to participation at any 
time.12 
This statement, which became known as the Declaration of 
Helsinki, further clarified the rights of research subjects, 
11 Hans-Martin Sass, "Reichsrundschreiben 1931: Pre- 
Nuremberg German Regulations Concerning New Therapy and Human 
Experimentation", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 8 (1983), 
p.106. 
12 Declaration of Helsinki, 1964, quoted in Appendix II, 
Beauchamp and Childress, p.343. 
V. 
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which derive from the principle of autonomy. 
The Declaration of Helsinki served not only to define the 
rights of research subjects, but to draw attention to them. It 
became possible, with guideline in hand, to examine experiments 
and decide whether or not they in fact complied with the stated 
ethical principles. Not surprisingly, various experiments were 
found wanting in this regard. 
Among the most controversial of these experiments was the 
Tuskegee syphilis study. This study commenced in 1932 under the 
auspices of the U.S. Public Health Service, and was not 
terminated until 1972. Some 400 black male residents of Macon 
County, Alabama, were enrolled in an experiment to observe the 
course of untreated syphilis. Physicians at the time knew the 
grave consequences of untreated syphilis, and believed that an 
effective treatment existed in arsenic therapy. The subjects 
were not warned that effective therapy existed, and that their 
participation in the experiment therefore posed an unnecessary 
risk to them. Thus, they were not informed of the treatment 
options either at the start of the study, or in the 1950's, when 
penicillin proved to be both unmistakably effective and widely 
available. 
Indeed, the subjects were not even informed that they were 
in an experiment. They believed that they were being treated 
without charge by government doctors. It is true that they were 
not charged, but neither were they treated. In fact, the 
researchers circulated a list of names of participants to local 
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health facilities and to the Army, in which some of the subjects 
served, and requested that these men not be treated for syphilis 
because of their participation in the study. 
Nor was the Tuskegee study a brief aberration. Although its 
findings had been reported in the scientific literature 
sporadically over the years, the study was not widely known until 
word of it appeared in the national press in 1972. HEW then 
convened a panel, but by the time this group issued its 
condemning Final Report a year later, between 30 and 100 men were 
estimated to have died directly as a result of advanced 
syphilis.13 
The Tuskegee study, rife with racism, deceit, and the 
decades-long abuse of a disadvantaged rural population stands as 
an unusually chilling example of how wrong physicians could be in 
their treatment of research subjects. These doctors honored 
neither the Hippocratic tradition of nonmaleficence, nor the 
rights-based tradition of informed consent. Although conceived 
in the 1930's, one cannot lay the blame entirely on the 
thoughtlessness of an earlier generation, for the study was 
reviewed and continually funded by the Public Health Service 
throughout its forty year history. The public outcry following 
the press's exposure of the study indicated that such practices 
would not be tolerated. 
13 Allan Brandt, "Racism and Research: The Case of the 




Thus, by the early 1970's there emerged a clear conception 
of the rights of research subjects as autonomous persons 
deserving of respect. The rights of patients developed along 
parallel lines, particularly stressing the right to informed 
consent14. In 1973, the American Hospital Association summarized 
these developments in the Patient's Bill of Rights. The Bill 
lists and describes such rights as that to "respectful care," 
informed consent, and confidentiality. Interestingly, in its 
concluding paragraph, the Bill states that, "No catalog of rights 
can guarantee for the patient the kind of treatment he has a 
right to expect." Therefore, the hospital must structure all its 
activities in order to ensure "above all, the recognition of [the 
patient's] dignity as a human being. Success in achieving this 
recognition assures success in the defense of the rights of the 
patient."15 
Standards for Decision-Making 
It is against this historical background that the standards 
of decision-making for incompetent patients developed, and are 
still evolving. We will review them as they now exist. 
Competent patients, i.e., those of "adult years and sound mind" 
have the right, clearly established in common law, to refuse any 
14 see Jay Katz, Silent World, especially chapter 3. 
15 American Hospital Association, 1973, quoted in Appendix 




When we are confronted with a once-competent patient, we 
must search for previous expressions about what treatments he 
thought appropriate in the event of becoming incompetent. 
Rarely, we discover a patient who has left a detailed account of 
these views, and then we use the substitute judgment standard. 
Brother Fox is an example of such a patient. In the context of a 
formal discussion in his religious community, 83 year old Brother 
Fox stated, in reference to the Quinlan case, that he would not 
want "heroic" measures, such as artificial respiration, if he 
were irreversibly comatose. He repeated these views to his 
superior before entering the hospital for a herniorrhaphy. 
Brother Fox suffered complications of general anesthesia, and 
went into a coma17. The court appropriately used the substitute 
judgment standard and removed the respirator. This standard, 
thus, is correctly used for patients who, when competent, 
expressed clear views on treatments they would find acceptable 
when incompetent. 
Proxy decisions, i.e., decisions for the incompetent, are 
more difficult for patients who were never competent, or who 
never stated views on life-sustaining treatment. According to 
the President's Commission, we ought not to use the substitute 
judgment standard for such patients, since we are not in a 
16 Schloendorff; see ref. 4. 
17 Matter of Eichner, on behalf of Fox, 438 NYS 2nd Series, 
266; March, 1981. 
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position to know what they would do if competent. We must 
instead use the best interest standard18. 
The best interest standard is defined, according to the 
President's Commission, "by reference to more objective, 
societally shared criteria...[It] does not rest on self- 
determination but solely on protection of patient's welfare."19 
This standard does not set out to maximize autonomy, but 
protection. The Commission goes on, however, to add that the 
surrogate decision-maker should "...choose a course that will 
promote the patient's well-being as it would probably be 
conceived by a reasonable person in the patient's 
circumstances... ."20 
The best interest standard, due to its use of "objective 
criteria," as "conceived by a reasonable person," has not always 
been adequate to its task. In the Saikewicz case, for instance, 
the judge considered and rejected the best interest standard. 
Joseph Saikewicz was a 67 year old, severely retarded, non-verbal 
and permanently institutionalized man who bore the diagnosis of 
acute myeloblastic monocytic leukemia. If Saikewicz received 
chemotherapy, he would have about a forty percent chance of a 
18 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to 
Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment. Washington, D.C., U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1983, p.134. 
19 Ibid.. p.135. 
20 Ibid.. p.136. 
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remission, which might last from two to thirteen months21. 
Most patients with this form of leukemia do elect chemotherapy. 
The judge felt that the most common decision, that made by most 
people, must be the "reasonable" one. Yet he realized that other 
people were not like Saikewicz; they could understand the reason 
for their painful treatment, whereas he could not. Therefore, 
they were not truly "in his circumstances." The judge was 
extremely reluctant to impose on Saikewicz a painful therapy for 
which he could understand neither the nature nor the purpose. 
On a practical level, it would be hard to administer the 
treatment without Saikewicz's cooperation. Furthermore, the 
judge wished to preserve for Saikewicz the possibility of 
refusal, which each one of these competent patients had. Thus, 
the judge tried to incorporate into his decision subjective 
factors which he rightfully considered to be central. The only 
method he could devise was to reject the unyieldingly objective 
best interest standard and adapt the substitute judgment 
standard, although Saikewicz had never been competent. The judge 
asks us to indulge in the fiction that Saikewicz could for an 
instant be competent, yet realize that he would soon, once again, 
be permanently incompetent. He theorizes that Saikewicz would 
then choose to forego chemotherapy. This bizarre approach 
attempts to correct the flaws of the best interest standard by 
including important subjective factors in a decision for a never- 
21 Matter of Saikewicz, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 




The Saikewicz decision was written several years before the 
President's Commission's recommendations on the use of the 
substitute judgment and best interest standards. If the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts were deciding the case today, they would 
know that substitute judgment was "wrong" for Saikewicz, but they 
might still be dissatisfied with the best interest standard. 
Neither standard accommodates the need to include subjective 
factors when deciding for never competent patients. Thus, the 
standards are inadequate. We shall need to develop, therefore, 
within the ethics of responsibility, standards which will 
accommodate subjective criteria in decisions for the never- 
competent. 
The legal standards make the assumption that when a patient 
cannot competently tell us of his subjective experiences, we 
cannot know them, and so must disregard them in our decision¬ 
making. Yet even persons with severely compromised competence 
do have subjective experiences, and these can be known by us to 
an extent. For instance, when Mary Hier, a ninety-two year old, 
chronically demented patient persistently removed her gastrostomy 
feeding tube, she was indicating that the tube was painful to 
her. The Massachusetts court placed considerable credence in 
these communications, although they were those of an 
incompetent22. Thus, the court decided not to force Mrs. Hier to 
undergo surgery for the reimplantation of her tube, even though 
22 In the Matter of Mary Hier, 18 Mass. App. 200 (1984). 
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she would then lack any route by which to receive life-sustaining 
nutrition. 
If we were to ignore subjective factors, we would be 
categorically denying information which ought to figure heavily 
in our decisions. For it is in this realm of the subjective in 
which suffering occurs, and the incompetent are in no way 
excluded from suffering. Eric Cassell has commented on the need 
to improve our understanding of suffering: 
Attempting to understand what suffering is and how 
physicians might truly be devoted to its relief will require 
that medicine and its critics overcome the dichotomy between 
mind and body and the associated dichotomies between 
subjective and objective and between person and object.23 
The acknowledgment of suffering is crucial for medical decisions 
within the ethics of responsibility; such knowledge requires that 
we strive to understand the communications of the incompetent. 
Thus, we have briefly examined some of the forces which 
shape contemporary medical ethics. The Hippocratic Oath stressed 
the beneficence of autonomous physicians caring for dependent 
patients. Many have come to see this as a paternalistic 
attitude. In addition, patients have discovered that doctors are 
fallible in their assessments of what constitutes the patient's 
best interest. Thus, patients have demanded a greater degree of 
control over their medical care. In addition, more recent 
ethical codes have urged us to acknowledge that both research 
subjects and patients are autonomous persons deserving of 
23 Eric Cassell, "The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of 
Medicine", New England Journal of Medicine, (NEJM), 306, #11, p.640. 
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respect. Autonomy has emerged as the dominant principle in 
contemporary medical ethics. It has grown in importance as 
various groups, patients among them, have learned to insist on 
respect, and on the rights which they feel are their due, self- 
rule being chief among them. 
In an historical context, it becomes easier to comprehend 
why medical ethicists today rely heavily on autonomy in their 
analyses. This concept has been the means by which patients and 
research subjects have asserted their dignity as persons able to 
make choices. But while the notion of autonomy has played a 
central role in the evolution of medical ethics, and while this 
role has been in large part positive, there is no guarantee that 
autonomy will prove useful in solving all questions in 
comtemporary medical ethics. As we shall see in the following 
chapter, difficulties arise when we rely too greatly on autonomy 




Chapter III: Autonomy Questioned 
Autonomy played an invaluable role in the development of 
medical ethics in the last few decades. Its preeminence, 
however, has recently come under scrutiny, even by those who have 
been its most ardent supporters. First, not all definitions of 
autonomy are suitable for medical ethics. For one thing, 
autonomy in its most exaggerated form would leave patients 
unpleasantly isolated. Witness, for instance, Sartre's account 
of the conditions necessary for autonomy: 
Man can will nothing unless he has first understood that he 
must count on no one but himself; that he is alone, 
abandoned on earth in the midst of his infinite 
responsibilities, without help, with no other aim than the 
one he sets himself, with no other destiny than the one he 
forges for himself on this earth.24 
Ethics would have won a strange victory indeed if it battled 
paternalism so that patients might feel "abandoned" and "without 
help." Sartre's definition is not what medical ethicists would 
describe as their goal for patients. 
However, extreme ideas of autonomy, not unlike Sartre's, can 
filter into discussions of medical ethics. Daniel Callahan has 
pointed out a number of distorted and exaggerated notions of 
autonomy which he finds not in the philosophical literature but 
in common parlance, "in the streets." Callahan believes that 
these popular misuses can reveal weaknesses in a concept as it is 
24 Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Trans, by H. 
Barnes, New York, Washington Square Press, 1943. 
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transferred from the abstract into the real world. One such 
distortion of autonomy is the notion that "respect for the 
autonomy of others is sufficient ground for overriding my own 
conscience."25 Like Sartre's definition, this version of 
autonomy would have damaging repercussions if acted upon by 
physicians. 
But Callahan finds more that is disturbing about autonomy 
than that it can be abused. It is the lynch pin of medical 
ethics, yet it tells us nothing about many aspects of ethical 
conduct. For instance, autonomy cannot tell us how we are to 
conduct ourselves within a moral community. Bland 
recommendations not to interfere with the autonomy of other 
persons do not tell us how we are to respond to a call for help 
from a drowning man. Thus, Callahan fears that to put autonomy 
before all other values, 
buys our freedom at too high a price. It establishes 
contractual relationships as the principal and highest form 
of relationships. It elevates isolation and separation as 
the necessary starting point of human commitments. It 
presumes that the moral life can be made a wholly voluntary 
matter..., thus attempting to deny the validity of many 
uninvited moral obligations that ordinary life with other 
people usually casts before us.26 
Thus autonomy, even in its purest form, cannot be the sole guide 
to ethical behavior. We must look further if we are to discern a 
basis for life with other people. 
Callahan is not the only writer who has been a staunch 
25 Daniel Callahan, "Autonomy: A Moral Good, Not a Moral 
Obsession," Hastings Center Report. October, 1984, p.41. 
26 Ibid., p.41. 
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defender of autonomy, and yet who now feels that its location at 
the pinnacle of medical ethics must be re-examined. In 
"Autonomy's Temporary Triumph," Robert Veatch examines the 
ascendance of autonomy in its historical context. He believes 
that autonomy was necessarily granted paramount importance in 
order to create a "principle that responded to an extreme 
paternalism."27 Paternalism may not be gone without a trace in 
practice, according to Veatch, but it has effectively been 
banished as a concept worthy of respect in the literature of 
medical ethics. Thus, Veatch feels that we may now turn our 
attention to tasks that lie ahead. 
Like Callahan, Veatch finds wanting in autonomy a guide for 
relations in a community of ethical persons. Thus, he writes: 
That autonomy trumped Hippocratic paternalism said nothing 
about the relation of autonomy to our duty to others to 
organize a community in a moral way. Thus, the goal has 
become one of recovering our sense of a moral 
community....28 
What Veatch tells us therefore, is that autonomy was a worthy 
first step in the construction of a more complete system of 
ethics. Autonomy guides relations between individual patients 
and doctors, but what is needed now is to graft onto this 
structure principles which will help us in larger social 
situations. 
Veatch wants to go beyond the individual, who is both 
27 Robert M. Veatch, "Autonomy's Temporary Triumph," 
Hastings Center Report. October, 1984, p.38. 
28 Ibid.. p.39. 

26 
guided and protected by autonomy, to include the community in an 
"ethic of justice." Autonomy will gradually take its rightful 
place among a host of values in this ethic of the future, and 
indeed will regain the lustre it has today only in those "rare 
cases" which concern an "isolated patient exercising his or her 
will unbounded by obligations to others."29 
Interestingly, Veatch never pauses to define the moral 
community he hopes to build. He does make passing reference to 
"an ethic of justice" which "affirms the equal status of 
individuals."30 He does not mention any obligations felt by one 
equal individual toward another, nor does he discuss special 
protections for vulnerable persons. Although it is unfair to 
criticize Veatch1s definition of community when he has not 
clearly presented it, the implication is that persons remain 
equal yet isolated when a community is founded upon autonomy. 
As Veatch reflects upon autonomy's ascendance, and its now 
possible re-evaluation, he makes reference to that case which he 
feels most contributed to "autonomy's temporary triumph." 
Curiously enough, he cites the now famous case of Karen Quinlan, 
a young girl who lapsed into an irreversible coma. Karen's 
breathing was controlled by an artificial respirator, without 
which it was believed she would not survive. Her parents fought, 
against medical advice, to have this device removed. After 
protracted legal battles, Karen's father won the right to have 




her respirator removed, so that she might be allowed to die. 
(Ironically, Miss Quinlan survived ten years after artificial 
respiration was discontinued.) 
Veatch's discussion of Quinlan reveals a curious 
inconsistency. He tells us first that it is Quinlan whose case 
"established firmly and finally that there are limits on the 
physician's authority to do what he or she thinks will benefit 
the patient."31 While it is true that such limits were clarified 
by the Quinlan decision, I cannot share with Veatch the 
conclusion that Quinlan therefore offers proof that "autonomy 
trumped Hippocratic paternalism." Although paternalism has been 
dealt a blow, and rightly so, it is not at all clear that 
autonomy is the victor. 
Since autonomy had proved fruitful in the struggle of 
research subjects and competent patients who desired respect, it 
is not surprising that Veatch would turn to this concept to solve 
Quinlan's dilemma. In this case, however, autonomy does not show 
us the path to respect. 
I would not describe the legacy of Quinlan as the triumph 
of autonomy. Quinlan meant the end of a certain sort of autonomy 
for physicians, an autonomy which sometimes amounted to 
arrogance. Thus, paternalism was indeed trumped. However, the 
decision does not represent a victory for patient autonomy, for 
no patient could be less autonomous than Karen Quinlan. 
The emphasis on autonomy seems cruelly misplaced as we 
31 Ibid., p.39. 
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consider the plight of this wholly dependent young woman. There 
must be some other principle or quality we may call upon in order 
to demonstrate respect for a patient like Quinlan. We might 
invoke the "right to die," or alternatively the "right to life," 
but both these rights seem somehow hollow without an autonomous 
individual to claim one and forego the other. Karen's father 
believed that he was most qualified to determine both what was 
best for her, and what she would want. Thus, he invokes the right 
of parents to make decisions for their dependent children. And 
yet that right is curtailed by the doctrine of parens patriae — 
the duty of the state to protect vulnerable persons, including 
children whose parents may make harmful decisions for them. 
We might invoke a number of other rights, but each 
is flawed in precisely the same way; they seem to draw attention 
away from where it belongs, on Karen Quinlan, the dependent 
patient, who is incapable of exercising any right. 
It is possible to describe the dilemma of Quinlan in a way 
that does not focus on autonomy or on any other right. We may 
view the situation as one involving various persons, each acting 
in good faith, and each attempting to express a different idea of 
what will benefit Karen. Karen is also an actor in a sense, in 
that her presence forms a cry for help. Her plight demands that 
we act upon those responsibilities we feel as members of a moral 
community. 
Karen's family acts within the relationship of love; they 
want an end to her suffering. Her physicians, we assume, act 
' 
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upon their sense of professional duty. They do not want to 
abandon their patient; they would like to do everything medically 
possible for her. This conflict is not essentially one of 
autonomy versus paternalism; it is between various persons who 
feel an obligation to help someone who is dependent upon them, a 
theme we will develop in subsequent chapters. 
Thus, I disagree with Veatch, who says autonomy should be 
our first principle in cases like that of Quinlan, and that we 
must add lesser principles to it as we include the concerns of 
the community. I believe that we should be able to devise one 
set of principles which show us how to respect both autonomous 
and non-autonomous patients. As it is, we have a system which 
tells us nothing about how autonomous persons behave within 
communities. Even worse, this emphasis on autonomy seems to deny 
the very existence of an incompetent patient like Quinlan. We 
cannot simultaneously respect the patient and ignore the 
conditions of her existence. The failure of autonomy is upon us, 
for we are already in our community, which is comprised of both 
autonomous and dependent persons, and sorely in need of an ethics 
to guide us. 
■ 
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Chapter IV: Theories of Moral Development 
Kohlberg's Stages 
Often, studies from another discipline may shed light on 
one’s own endeavors. In the present case, psychological studies 
of moral development may help us in our examination of medical 
ethics. Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg has described moral 
development as striving toward an ethics of rights. As in the 
legal system, he places autonomy, guided by reason, before all 
other principles. His work has been usefully criticized by his 
former student, Carol Gilligan. The flaws she finds in 
Kohlberg's system will direct us as we examine medical ethics 
with its current emphasis on autonomy. 
Kohlberg greatly advanced the study of moral development. 
He believed that development occurs by way of a set of 
irreversible and invariant stages. As children's cognitive 
capacities mature, so too do their capacities for moral 
reasoning. Thus, Kohlberg felt that moral reasoning did not 
merely change with age, but improved. Further, these 
improvements were linked to a child's ability to grasp a set of 
hierarchical moral principles, beginning with the most primitive 
and working up to the most sophisticated. Thus, if a child 
reasoned at level two of Kohlberg's six stages, he would almost 
certainly not be able to understand reasoning at level five or 
six. The reverse, however, would not be true; children 

31 
reasoning at level five would have passed through level two and 
would thus be able to comprehend its underlying principles. 
Kohlberg believed that these principles were universal to 
all cultures and all eras. Although he found that the majority 
of adults in some cultures reasoned at a "lower" level than those 
of other cultures, he attributed this difference not to a bias in 
the theory nor to inherent inferiority of the less advanced 
cultures, but to a poverty of environment that left those groups 
unexposed to more advanced forms of moral reasoning. Those 
cultures which seemed to lag behind by Kohlberg's measures tended 
to be rural and non-Western.32 
Kohlberg's basic method was simple yet elegant. He 
presented the volunteer with a hypothetical moral dilemma. This 
person was asked how he would solve the problem, and why. The 
Heinz dilemma was the one most frequently used. In this story, 
Heinz's wife suffers from a deadly disease. A drug exists which 
can save her life, but the druggist will only sell it for two 
thousand dollars in cash. Heinz is a poor man with no access to 
such a sum. The volunteer must decide what Heinz should do, and 
explain the reasons. These reasons, and the moral maturity they 
reflect, determine one's level in the Kohlberg system. 
A detailed examination of Kohlberg's stages is beyond the 
scope of this work; we will describe the stages briefly, and 
comment on those principles which are relevant. 
32 Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development, 
San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1971, chapters 2-5. 
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Kohlberg's theory posits three levels which are broken up 
into six stages. The preconventional level is the least 
advanced, and contains stages one and two. Persons who operate 
at level one are concerned with obeying rules in order to avoid 
punishment. At level two, persons act to further their own self- 
interest. 
The next level up in Kohlberg's hierarchy is the 
conventional level. Persons at stage three, "the stage of mutual 
interpersonal expectations," are concerned with "keeping mutual 
relationships, maintaining trust, loyalty, respect, and 
gratitude." Motivation centers on the need to be perceived as 
good in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others.33 Stage four, 
also within the conventional level, is characterized by the 
desire to fulfill obligations to which one has agreed, in order 
that society and its institutions may be maintained; this stage 
has been dubbed the "law and order mentality." 
The postconventional level begins with stage five, in which 
the right is upholding the basic values of a group, even when 
those values conflict with actual laws of the group. One upholds 
these values because of a felt obligation to protect one's own 
rights and those of others. Just like pledges to uphold the law, 
"Family, friendship, trust and work obligations are also 
commitments or contracts freely entered into...."34 
For a person who has reached stage six, moral behavior is 
33 Kohlberg, 1981, p.411. 
34 Ibid.. p.412. 
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"guided by universal ethical principles. Particular laws are... 
valid because they rest on such principles." One behaves this 
way because, "as a rational person, one has seen the validity of 
principles and has become committed to them." This highest stage 
is consistent with Kant's vision of an autonomous will guided 
solely by reason. 
Thus, concentrating on stages three through six, Kohlberg 
depicts a line of development which moves from "mutual 
interpersonal expectations," to a drive to maintain social 
systems, to a stage where relations are viewed as contractual. 
The highest stage derives from a Kantian social perspective of a 
"rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the 
basic moral premise of respect for other persons as ends, not 
means."35 
Kohlberg's hierarchy of principles is like current 
medical ethics, for both award the greatest respect to the 
Kantian principle of autonomy. Both systems are consistent with 
the ethics of rights. In addition, Kohlberg explicitly describes 
the desire to maintain relationships because of human feeling as 
a less advanced principle, to be surpassed by learning to see 
relationships as essentially contractual. 
Gilligan's Critique 
In the early 1970's, Carol Gilligan, hoping to study the 




dilemmas, cast about for an appropriate research topic. Gilligan 
chose to study pregnant women who were considering abortions. 
The women discussed their own real dilemma, and also reflected 
upon hypothetical cases, such as the Heinz dilemma. Her method 
thus differed from that of Kohlberg, who used only hypothetical 
dilemmas. Gilligan noticed that when women's responses were 
graded according to Kohlberg's stages, few women passed the level 
of conventional reasoning, as compared to men of similar age and 
educational background. Gilligan also drew attention to the fact 
that all the subjects in Kohlberg's original study, from which he 
derived his stages, were male. 
These observations could be explained in a number of 
different ways. Kohlberg, like his predecessors in psychology, 
believed that women were in fact limited in their moral 
development. He hoped, though, that as they moved beyond the 
domestic sphere and into the professions, the more complex moral 
dilemmas they encountered would stimulate their development to 
stages five and six.36 
Gilligan preferred a different explanation. She suggested 
that women's moral reasoning is neither stunted nor 
developmentally delayed, as had been suggested by Freud and 
Piaget before Kohlberg, but that it honors principles neglected 
in systems like that of Kohlberg. We will describe the moral 
principles elicited by Gilligan as an ethics of responsibility, 
36 Lawrence Kohlberg and R. Kramer, "Continuities and 
Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development," Human 
Development. 1969, Vol. 12, pp.93-120. 
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or of care. The ethics described by Kohlberg we will refer to as 
the ethics of justice, or of rights. 
A Different Developmental Sequence 
According to Gilligan, what Kohlberg has described is one 
possible sequence of moral development, but one that does not 
apply to the women in the abortion study. Gilligan proposes that 
the moral development of these women follows a different 
sequence, which she sets out to describe. This sequence includes 
three stages, and these are demarcated by two transitional 
phases. 
The first and most primitive of these three stages is 
characterized by the quest for personal survival. A person in 
stage one cares only for the self, and sees the needs of others 
exclusively in terms of self-interest. An example of such logic 
is provided by one of the participants in the abortion study, in 
response to the Heinz dilemma: 
Stealing might be wrong, but if you have to do it to 
survive yourself or even kill, that is what you should 
do.... Preservation of oneself, I think, is the most 
important thing. It comes before anything else in life.37 
This first phase recedes as one begins to realize that the 
exclusive pursuit of personal survival is selfish; the emergence 
of such self-criticism marks the first transition. A person 
whose reasoning attains the second phase eschews the selfishness 
37 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women's Development. Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1982, p.76. 
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of the past, and seeks instead for a new sense of responsibility 
and social participation. This new phase is not without 
deficiencies, however, for in it the needs of others are placed 
above those of the self, and self-sacrifice stands as the moral 
ideal. Moral choice at this stage closely resembles that 
assigned to the stereotype of the all-loving, all-giving mother. 
Gilligan offers a number of examples of this "feminine 
identification of goodness with self-sacrifice."38 One woman, in 
deciding whether or not to abort, discussed her responsibilities 
not only toward the fetus and her unsupportive lover, but also 
toward his wife and children, without giving equivalent 
consideration to her own needs. Another young woman described 
her inability to criticize thus: "I never want to hurt anyone, 
and I tell them in a nice way, and I have respect for their 
opinions, and they can do the things they want."39 Concealed 
within this "niceness" is a passivity, a willingness to let 
others act and to attribute one's own actions to another's 
demands or needs. 
Although this level of reasoning betrays some philosophic 
inconsistency, it also reveals some positive attributes within 
the ethics of care. Already displayed are the desire to avoid 
hurting others, even if this should entail bending the rules of 
justice. Also visible is the goal of maintaining relationships 
between the parties in a dispute, even though it may require, at 




this stage, a sacrifice of personal aims. 
The second transition commences when the individual realizes 
that violence is done to the self by a too exclusive concern for 
the needs of others. The passivity of the second phase comes 
into question, and these women face clearly and honestly their 
identity as the maker of moral choices. They take responsibility 
for decisions and their consequences. Thus, in the third phase, 
one strives to incorporate the self into that community which is 
deserving of non-violent treatment; there is a balance of care 
for self and other. 
Throughout her book, Gilligan argues that progress in moral 
reasoning is linked to progress in self-concept; women whose 
reasoning attains the third level persistently refer to this 
link, offering evidence for Gilligan's contention. For example, 
one woman describes herself in the past thus: 
Usually paying off some sort of debt, going around 
serving people who are not really worthy of my attention, 
because somewhere in life I got the impression that my needs 
are really secondary to other people's, and that if I...make 
any demands on other people to fulfill my needs, I'd feel 
guilty for it and submerge my own in favor of other 
people's, which backfires on me, and I feel a great deal of 
resentment for other people....^0 
Having reflected on the errors of these past perceptions, the 
same woman goes on to describe her current ideas of 
responsibility: 
I have this responsibility to myself, and you know, for once 
I am beginning to realize that that really matters to me. 
Instead of doing what I want for myself and feeling guilty 
over how selfish I am, you realize that that is a very usual 
40 Ibid., pp.92-3. 
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way for people to live....41 
This woman comes to accept her needs as equivalent in weight to 
those of the people she loves. Her stance is neither excessively 
selfish nor self-sacrificing. 
In summary, Gilligan's sequence moves from selfishness 
toward a sense of responsibility for others instead of for the 
self. From this emphasis on self-sacrifice, one moves to the 
view that self and other are interdependent, and that both 
deserve attention within the ethics of care. Although Gilligan 
describes this third phase as the highest within her system, she 
suggests that even greater maturity and moral insight are reached 
by those who blend her system with Kohlberg's, taking into 
consideration both the ethics of responsibility and of rights. 
Distinguishing Features: Maintaining Relations 
Apart from a different set of stages, this new orientation 
has several characteristics which distinguish it from Kohlberg's 
system. Chief among these differences is the emphasis on 
maintaining relations among disputing parties. Indeed, it is 
this feature which provides the springboard for Gilligan's attack 
on Kohlberg. In Kohlberg's system, such social concern causes a 
response to be ranked as stage three out of six, i.e., one guided 
by conventional rather than principled reasoning. However, this 
concern is central to so many of the female participants in 
Gilligan's abortion study that the vast majority of their 
41 Ibid., p.94. 
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responses are categorized as conventional. It is women's concern 
for maintaining relations that is considered in Kohlberg's system 
as "immature." The core of Gilligan's argument is that this 
concern is mature and appropriate; that it has been deemed 
otherwise is the result of a persistent, long-standing distortion 
in psychological theory. Gilligan indicts not only Kohlberg for 
the work that causes women's responses to seem deficient; she 
also criticizes such renowned figures as Freud, Piaget and 
Erikson. It is, in part, this wide-ranging nature of her 
critique that garnered for Gilligan's book so much attention, 
both favorable and unfavorable. 
Gilligan argues that earlier writers have singled out such 
values as independence and detachment as goals of maturity, and 
have undervalued interdependence and attachment. If 
psychological development has traditionally been viewed as a 
struggle for ever more independence, moral development has 
appeared in an analogous fashion, as a struggle for increasing 
intellectual detachment and autonomy. Such a view is consistent 
with the ethics described by Kohlberg, with its rule-oriented 
approach to moral reasoning. Gilligan argues that this over¬ 
emphasis on detachment is not only inaccurate, in that it does 
not describe the development of women, but also that it is 
philosophically inadequate, in that it denies the importance of 
attachment in morality. 
In more recent work, Gilligan has considered the origins of 
both the care and justice orientations in moral reasoning. She 
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theorizes that both "voices" arise from certain profound 
childhood experiences. One such experience is that of inequality, 
the child's "awareness of being smaller and less capable than 
adults and older children."42 From this experience, Gilligan 
argues, psychologists have learned to define morality as justice, 
and development as progress toward equality and independence. 
However, Gilligan notes, the experience of attachment is as 
prevalent and as critical as that of inequality in shaping 
children's notions of right and wrong, and it is from this 
experience that the care orientation derives. She finds that the 
majority of women and men, when asked to resolve moral conflicts, 
will introduce both justice and care concerns, but will focus 
their reasoning on one orientation or the other. Women who focus 
tend to do so almost equally in either category, while men who 
focus do so almost exclusively in the justice orientation. 
Gilligan's work has been quite controversial, particularly as it 
relates to sex differences. A careful reading of her work, 
particularly the more recent studies, reveals that her concern is 
not simply about the devaluation of women's moral judgments; she 
also defends men who reason within the ethics of care. Rather, 
she decries the notion that attachment is unworthy to affect 
moral questions. Gilligan does not insist that women always 
reason one way and men another, but that there are two moral 
viewpoints that deserve to be heard respectfully. 
42 Carol Gilligan and Grant Wiggins, "The Origins of 
Morality in Early Childhood Relationships," unpublished draft, 
November, 1985, p.5. 
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Gilligan uses two opposites of the word "dependence" to 
reveal salient differences in the two systems: 
These contrasting opposites of dependence — independence 
and isolation — illuminate the shift in the valence of 
relationships that occurs when connection with others is 
experienced as impeding autonomy and when it is experienced 
as protecting against isolation.43 
One's ideas about attachment alter notions about whether 
detachment is good or bad. From this example we learn much about 
how Gilligan views the two moral orientations. Neither care nor 
justice provides a "better" way of seeing, but each does provide 
a vastly different viewpoint; so different, in fact, that each 
orientation seems to require a different language. Thus, a 
concept like dependence may have a radically different meaning, 
and may be subject to either praise or blame, according to one's 
point of view. The lessons of one orientation may be inaudible 
to those who speak the language of the other. 
In addition to providing insight about how misunderstandings 
arise, Gilligan's example of the contrasting opposites of 
dependence reveals some of her reservations about standard 
notions of moral maturity. By inviting the concept of attachment 
into the moral domain, Gilligan causes us to re-examine 
traditional concepts. She challenges the notion that detachment 
is essential for mature moral judgment, and asks us instead to 
imagine circumstances when detachment can prevent moral reasoning 
43 Carol Gilligan, "Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images 
of the Self in Relationship," in Reconstructing Individualism, 
ed. by Ian Watt; Palo Alto, California, Stanford University 
Press, 1986, p.251-2. 
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from reaching its full potential. Thus, "the seemingly valuable 
capacity to resist impulses toward domination and treat self and 
other with equal respect can be seen as the problematic ability 
to resist moral feeling and turn away from need."44 We shall 
return to this problem when we discuss the concept of emotional 
neutrality in the legal system, in chapter V. 
For Gilligan, the link between morality and relation is not 
part of a phase to be outgrown, but is the necessary context for 
moral choice. The recognition of attachment, also known as love, 
is the central difference between the systems of Gilligan and 
Kohlberg. Indeed, this concept is of such singular importance in 
Gilligan's model that all other distinguishing features follow 
from it. We shall investigate further the interaction of 
attachment and morality in chapter VI, when we examine Iris 
Murdoch's work. 
Rules and Their Role 
Piaget observed that boys and girls at play evinced notably 
different ideas about how and when rules ought to be used. 
Gilligan builds on this work to describe how rules are perceived 
within the ethics of care. Piaget noted a certain zest in boys 
for the elaboration of rules, and of procedures for settling 
conflicts, while girls exhibited a "tolerant attitude toward 
rules."45 
44 Gilligan, "Origins of Morality," p.25. 
45 Gilligan, Different Voice, p.10. 
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More recent work has tended to corroborate Piaget's 
observations. When psychologist Janet Lever studied children's 
games, she found that when faced with conflict, girls tend to end 
the game rather than fight. Boys, on the other hand, seem to 
view the analysis and adjudication of conflict as an integral 
part of the game.46 In the flexible attitude displayed by girls 
toward rules, we can see the force of their notion of attachment. 
The game and its rules are not worth as much as the maintenance 
of peaceful relations. This attitude has in the past been part of 
what has caused Freud and other writers to find in women a poorly 
formed moral sense. Gilligan contests this, arguing that in 
certain circumstances, moral maturity may lie precisely in the 
ability to value relationships over rules. 
Specific Cases 
During her work on abortion decisions and in subsequent 
research, Gilligan noted more frequently in girls and women an 
eagerness to know the particulars of a situation; they seemed 
dissatisfied with the information provided in hypothetical 
dilemmas. For instance, in responding to the Heinz dilemma, 
girls persistently asked for additional information about the 
involved parties. Was Heinz a poor man, or a member of an 
oppressed minority? Was he likely to be treated fairly in court? 
The implication, and often the explicit justification for this 
curiosity, is that details make a difference. The particulars of 
46 Quoted in Gilligan, Different Voice, p.9. 
V. 
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a dispute, including the identities and circumstances of the 
people involved, matter enormously in terms of designing a 
morally correct solution. Gilligan's volunteers are not the only 
ones dissatisfied with hypotheticals. Male, as well as female, 
medical students will often press for details, without which they 
feel the case cannot be resolved, when presented with 
hyupothetical moral dilemmas.47 Hence, rules in the abstract do 
not always provide adequate guidance. The flaws of blind justice 
are discussed more fully in the following chapter. 
The implication is that those who reason within the care 
orientation, as the girls and women did, are unwilling to make 
certain basic assumptions in order to "solve" the Heinz dilemma. 
One such assumption is that the disputing parties are equal; each 
party has equal freedom of choice, and equal power to act upon 
their decisions. This emphasis on equality fits in well with the 
moral community hinted at by Veatch. By contrast, care-oriented 
reasoners do not assume equality, but instead suspect that 
inequalities exist, and that they will radically alter the nature 
of the "right" solution. Their desire to balance inequities of 
power and need causes these women discomfort in responding to 
hypothetical dilemmas. This difference in approach is one result 
of the shift from an ethics of rights to one of responsibilities. 
Uncertainty 
If women tend to demote rules as generating inadequate 
47 Robert Levine, personal communication. 
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solutions, it is not because they find greater certainty in 
another method. Indeed, many responders attribute their 
skepticism about rules to their belief that moral dilemmas can 
not be resolved with perfect clarity. Clarity itself becomes 
suspect, for fear that such certainty has been purchased by 
neglecting some subtle yet vital aspect of the situation. In her 
essay, "On Morality," Joan Didion reflects a profound distrust of 
moral certainty: 
There is some sinister hysteria in the air out here 
tonight, some hint of the monstrous perversion to which any 
human idea can come. ’I followed my conscience.' 'I did 
what I thought was best.' How many madmen have said it and 
meant it? How many murderers?...Maybe we have all said it, 
and maybe we have been wrong. Except on the most primitive 
level — our loyalties to those we love — what could be 
more arrogant than to claim the primacy of personal 
conscience?48 
Didion equates certainty with a "monstrous" arrogance, except 
when it occurs in the context of attachment. 
Gilligan's responders echo this mistrust of certainty, based 
on their conviction that there is always another way of looking 
at a situation. In noting that their system of moral reasoning 
"leaves them with conflict," these women do not see the lack of 
clarity as a flaw in the system, but as an inevitable problem in 
making moral choices. What certainty there is, is revealed 
through attachment. Here the responsibility-centered reasoners 
differ from their rights-centered counterparts, who feel that by 
correctly applying the right principles in a detached fashion, 
48 Joan Didion, "On Morality," Slouching Toward Bethlehem. 
New York, Washington Square Books, 1968, p.161. 
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the right solution can be unequivocally determined. One ought to 
avoid the influence of personal feelings. For example, one much 
quoted adolescent boy, reasoning within the ethics of rights, 
stated that the Heinz dilemma is "like a math problem with 
humans."49 
Why is it that the shift of emphasis from rights to 
responsibilities should lead to the acceptance of uncertainty? 
The answer, at least in part, lies in the belief that "right" 
answers are determined not by a permanent hierarchy of 
principles, which guide conduct among rational equals, but by a 
shifting network of inequities. The "right" answer in a dispute 
among equals might not serve at all when one person is more 
vulnerable, or otherwise more in need of protection. 
There are, however, other plausible explanations for the 
uncertainty so prevalent among care-oriented reasoners. One is 
that the women who predominantly make up Gilligan's sample do not 
find their style of reasoning supported by society as a whole. 
The experience of being told repeatedly that their concerns are 
not moral concerns, and that their reservations about 
hypothetical dilemmas are not valid, causes them to doubt their 
own judgments. Their experience is not unlike that of some 
doctors, whose reasoning focusses on the care of patients, yet 
whose decisions are judged within the ethics of rights to be 
inconsistent or irrelevant. 
Although Gilligan attributes part of the blame for this 
49 Gilligan, Different Voice, p.26. 
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uncertainty to society's justice-oriented bias, she also finds 
the care orientation itself to be partly at fault. Gilligan 
offers numerous examples of women who lose sight of their own 
point of view by their very ability to take into account the 
viewpoints of so many others. Consider, for instance, the young 
woman who accepted an abortion she did not want because of her 
perceived responsibilities toward the wife and children of her 
unsupportive lover. 
In the end, Gilligan finds uncertainty to be an inherent, 
but not necessarily an admirable feature of the care orientation. 
It is, perhaps, a flaw which balances an equivalent error in the 
justice orientation. She relates her view thus: 
If the persistent error in care reasoning is vacillation and 
lack of clear judgment, resulting from a tendency to include 
all possible ways of seeing, the persistent danger in the 
justice-reasoner is moral arrogance, the irrational faith in 
the infallibility of judgments from principles rigidly 
applied to a situation.5*^ 
Gilligan does not view the care orientation as superior to the 
justice orientation, but as a counterpart to it. The goal is not 
to substitute one orientation for the other, but to incorporate 
the lessons of each into an approach that corresponds to the 
complexity of human dilemmas. 
In summary, Gilligan offers us a new context in which to 
consider moral development and moral choice. This orientation 
favors attachment over detachment, and this increased emphasis on 
relation causes a shift in the value of other attributes. As we 
50 Gilligan, "Origins," p.34. 
3 . 
turn our gaze to the legal system, we will question its 




Chapter V: Implications for Medical Ethics 
No Contest 
Before distinguishing further the ethics of rights from the 
ethics of responsibility, let me set to rest one misconception: 
the ethics of rights is not a "bad" system exclusively favored by 
lawyers, in contrast to a "good” system favored by doctors. The 
ethics of rights is the mainstream voice of moral reasoning in 
our society. Kohlberg did not set out to describe the moral 
reasoning of lawyers, but of people in general. Gilligan did not 
set out to correct legal thought, but to argue that moral 
reasoning ought rightly to include an acknowledgment of the 
interdependence of human beings. The flaw in reasoning about 
proxy decisions cannot be simply ascribed to lawyers; nor is the 
solution to exclude legal intervention. The flaw is as much in 
the medical profession for not having learned to fashion 
decisions that are consistent and clear, and yet which 
incorporate the weight of subjective and emotional knowledge. 
Arguments persistently erupt about whether doctors or 
lawyers ought to make decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatments. Although doctors have long been involved in helping 
families through such decisions, it is not clear that they are 
well trained to do so, or that they are experts in this area. 
Although bonds exist between patients, doctors and families that 
establish the basis from which responsible decisions spring, this 
. 
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relation does not in and of itself guarantee good decisions. For 
these, one needs excellent communication and clear thinking to 
help families sort out the various technical, ethical and 
emotional dimensions of the dilemma. Not all doctors possess 
these qualities. 
Many lawyers believe these decisions are properly legal 
ones. George Annas strongly defends the adversary process as the 
best means for airing the viewpoints of all interested parties, 
and thus arriving at a disinterested version of the facts. 
However, Annas also states: 
Judges are asked to decide this question not because they 
have any special expertise, but because only they can 
provide the physicians with civil and criminal immunity for 
their actions. In seeking this immunity, legal 
considerations quickly transcend ethical and medical 
judgments.51 
Annas, staunch defender of legal intervention, admits that courts 
are not asked to intervene because of concern for the patient. 
The legal expertise demanded focuses on the threat of punishment 
to others, and thus represents a shunting away of attention from 
the vulnerable patient — a theme we shall return to later in the 
chapter. Although Annas believes that the courts nonetheless 
produce good decisions, it is not because of specifically legal 
expertise, but because the courts extend their mandate to include 
ethical issues. 
Thus, both law and medicine reach beyond technical expertise 
51 George Annas, "The Incompetent's Right to Die: The Case 




in grappling with issues of life-sustaining treatment. In 
general, because of their direct observation of the patient, 
doctors and families are well situated to determine which 
measures are benefits or burdens, and thus to approach the 
ethical dilemma with relevant data. For this reason, most proxy 
decisions are made without legal intervention. However, it is 
not possible to entirely escape legal supervision, for there will 
always be cases in which doctors and families cannot agree. In 
accord with the President's Commission, I feel that there are 
many fewer genuinely difficult cases than are commonly 
expected.52 By relying on the ethics of responsibility, and so 
creating clear, principled, humane decisions, we should be able 
to drastically reduce the need for judicial intervention. 
The enormous effort expended on procedural matters, such as 
who should decide, distracts us from the task of deciding what 
should be done. When physicians and courts have decided well, 
they have bent the traditional rules of analysis, and have 
included subjective and emotional factors. They have not always 
been clear, however, that this is what they are doing. And when 
poor decisions have been made, ones which uphold the rights but 
not the needs of the vulnerable patient, it is not always the 
fault of the courts. Indeed, in the case we shall examine most 
closely, that of John Storar, the courts sided with the 
physicians and against the family, to the detriment of the 
52 President's Commission, Deciding to Forego Life- 




As we discuss the ethics of care, some physicians may feel 
that these concepts are not entirely new, and they would be 
correct. The ethics of responsibility borrows form the 
Hippocratic tradition its insistence on care, while leaving 
behind the image of the doctor as sole decision-maker. The 
ethics of responsibility incorporates notions that match an old- 
fashioned ideal of the physician as an empathetic person who 
fought for cure yet never neglected to comfort the dying. The 
new-found ability to cure, or at least to intervene, leads us to 
denigrate this ancient duty. Dying patients do not represent our 
failures. Yet sometimes they appear to, and so our best efforts 
are expended in devising ways and reasons to treat. Although we 
should continue to seek cure where possible, we ought also to 
devote more energy to the care of the dying. 
The ethics of rights and of responsibility are not mutually 
exclusive. One need not reject the concept of rights in order to 
accept the ethics of responsibility. Rather, this new ethics is 
an attempt to incorporate concepts which are central to medical 
decision-making, yet which are difficult to express within the 
rights model. 
Although physicians, families and lawyers have all had 
occasion for dissatisfaction with legal remedies, most 
participants are willing to accept the system's flaws because 
they believe no reasonable alternative exists. The flaws of 
rights-based ethics in resolving medical dilemmas do not 
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represent necessary evils, however, but reveal instead that the 
legal context is fundamentally ill-suited to solving such 
dilemmas. 
By using Gilligan's ideas about relationship and 
responsibility as a point of departure, we can fashion a 
framework for resolving medical dilemmas — an ethics of care — 
which improves on the current legal model. 
Rights in Action 
Let us begin by examining rights-based ethics in action, 
i.e., in the courts. Each of the disputing parties hires a 
representative who presents the case as favorably as possible for 
his or her client. Generally, clients cease to communicate 
directly with each other, but interact only with their lawyers. 
The lawyers communicate less with each other than with the judge. 
In short, a series of barriers to communication is interposed 
between the disputants. The presentations of the two lawyers are 
evaluated by a judge, who is ideally neutral, and who will decide 
which representation is correct. Thus, essential features of a 
court case are the adversarial positions of the two disputing 
parties, the exchange of direct communication for third party 
communication, and the presence of a neutral observer, the judge, 
in whom rests the final authority. 
Two sets of objections may be raised against this 
theoretical description of the legal process. One is empirical: 
things don't work that way. The other is moral: we ought not to 
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do it that way. Let us address the empirical question first, and 
ask in what ways this picture is factually inaccurate. 
The question of judges' impartiality, specifically as it 
operates within medical dilemmas, has been addressed by Robert 
Burt in his interesting book, Taking Care of Strangers.53 Burt 
attacks the concept of the "choiceless self-conception," the 
notion that judges are mere conduits of justice. According to 
this idea, judges apply rules of law in a way that is not 
influenced by personal or emotional concerns. The judge is not an 
"I" who wrestles with issues as only he can, and decides for 
reasons that are unique to him as an individual. Rather, the 
judge is a very advanced sort of computer who dissects the case 
into its component parts, and analyses these according to rules 
which are, theoretically, publicly knowable. The judge then 
spews out an answer — the same answer that any other properly 
functioning computer would give. In this way the judge is 
"choiceless;" he is merely a location where there occurs a 
rational, theoretically repeatable process. This definition of 
the judge's role conforms to the concept of "legalism," as 
described by philosophers John Ladd and Judith Shklar. To them, 
legalism means, "the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to 
be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist 
of duties and rights determined by rules."54 
53 Robert Burt, Taking Care of Strangers. New York, The Free 
Press, 1979. 
54 John Ladd, "Legalism and Medical Ethics," Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy. 3 (March, 1979), p.4. 
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This "choiceless" judge, who is utterly rational and 
detached, is most at home in the ethics of justice, as described 
by Kohlberg. There is one right answer, which can be discovered 
with certainty by the process of reason. But this definition of 
the moral agent does not correspond to reality, as it exists in 
the courts. 
Burt notes that the concept of choicelessness was attacked 
as long ago as the 1930's by the "legal realists." However, he 
also points out that those authors failed to see the "seductive 
power" of this choiceless self-conception.55 Interestingly, Burt 
attributes the allure of the concept to the judge's desire to 
escape the painful burden of responsibility. 
Burt suggests that judges are not impartial, especially in 
cases of life and death. They maintain a pose that they are 
conduits of justice, and that they are unmoved by the impact of 
their decision on the life of the patient. The pose of 
neutrality is, however, a fiction. The very act of analyzing a 
case, and deciding which issues need concern us, and which do 
not, sets the case in a certain light. Such decisions are not 
made, according to Burt, on a purely rational basis. Neither is 
it true that if the facts are clear, the right decision follows 
obviously from them. In the medical dilemmas which concern us, 
the problem is one of moral choice. There may be factual issues 
to decide (can this patient feel pain?) but the greatest 
difficulties arise in deciding the moral aspect of the case (is 
55 Burt, p.19. 
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it right to terminate life support systems for a patient who 
feels, or does not feel, pain?). The emotional neutrality of 
judges may be compromised in any type of case, but is 
particularly at risk in medical cases. 
While judges cannot escape the impact of emotion, its effect 
is far greater on the patient's family members and physician, who 
are attached to the patient by special relationships that make 
emotional neutrality an impossibility. And here is where the 
moral objection to legalism arises — we should not aspire to the 
impartiality the law requires. It is by acknowledging 
connection, not denying it, that we make appropriate moral 
decisions. 
The Legal Battle 
An essential aspect of the legal system is its adversarial 
nature. How does this opposition function in relation to medical 
dilemmas? Again, we are confronted by the sensation of an 
improper fit between legalism and the task of making decisions 
for incompetent patients. First of all, the relationship between 
doctors and families is not inherently an adversarial one. 
Indeed, it must at one time have been otherwise or there would be 
no such relationship. The entrance into the legal system, 
however, lends official status to whatever pre-existing 
hostilities there might have been. 
If we return to the moment where the family and patient 
first make contact with the doctor, we find that, far from being 
1 
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adversaries, all are united by their common responsibility for 
the patient's welfare. Thus, these various parties, though they 
disagree, are not fundamentally opposed to one another, for no 
matter how bitterly they may dispute the methods, they work 
toward a common goal. 
One might argue — with some justice — that it is unfair to 
blame the legal system for all animosity between disputing 
parties. Considerable tension must exist before a medical 
question arrives in a court of law. However, the experience in 
court is unlikely to dissipate existing tensions. On the 
contrary, any revival of trust becomes increasingly unlikely 
because the disputants have little direct communication, while 
the lawyers depict the actions of the opposition in the most 
unfavorable light possible. As a result, one good outcome — the 
restoration of cordial relations between family and doctor — 
becomes a virtual impossibility before we even begin to resolve 
the medical dilemma. Thus, the imposition of the legal system 
onto medical dilemmas injects an adversarial note which is 
neither fundamental to them, nor helpful in crafting a 
responsible resolution of them. The severance of relations and 
trust which accompany the conclusion of this sort of medical 
dispute is not a legal success, but a medical tragedy: the 
network of persons jointly concerned for the patient's welfare is 
destroyed. 
Hostility is not simply a part of the legal process; it is 
essential to the very concept of rights. As Ladd argues: 
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To have a right is to have a right against someone...The 
natural and normal situation in which one asserts a right 
occurs when the person against whom it is asserted 
threatens, neglects, or otherwise appears unwilling to 
accede to one's requests, needs, or demands... In sum, the 
concept of rights is most characteristically invoked in an 
adversary context.56 
The standard position of participants in the legal system is 
to accept the adversarial nature of law as a necessary evil. For 
one thing, it is thought to be an efficient means of uncovering 
truth; the lawyers, who defend their clients as aggressively as 
possible, are tireless in their efforts to unearth unflattering 
data about the opposing side. Robert Burt presents an unusual 
form of this argument. He discusses the imbalances of power 
among various parties, including the judge and the incompetent 
patient. He claims that the adversarial process is helpful in 
protecting the patient from being "overpowered" in legal 
proceedings, because families and doctors are more likely to 
consider the patient's needs if they fear legal punishment for 
improper decisions.57 Burt also indicates that if families and 
doctors learn to respect patients as they ought, the result will 
be fewer decisions to terminate treatment. His contention is 
based on an inappropriate definition of respect, which we shall 
discuss in the following chapter. 
Contrary to what Burt suggests, I feel that the threat of 
punishment is more likely to prevent appropriate decision-making 
than to encourage it. Communication will hardly be fostered in 
56 Ladd, p.17. 
57 Burt, p.168. 
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such an atmosphere, yet it is sorely needed if all parties are to 
discuss their responsibilities and concerns for the patient. 
Indeed, the fear of reprisals serves to remove concern for the 
patient from center stage, and place there instead concern for 
one's own survival, as well as excessive worry for how an 
anonymous third party might view this decision from the outside. 
Sartre describes such a situation by asking us to imagine 
that someone catches us in the act of looking through a keyhole. 
Even if we are doing this because someone in the room has asked 
us to do so, in order to know what can be seen through the 
keyhole, we are made to feel guilt or shame because of the 
"suspicious stare of the Other."58 Similarly, physicians and 
families who know their actions could be evaluated in court, 
experience a shift in their own view of the decision-making 
process. This threatening influence leads to more concern about 
how things look, than about how they are. 
Burt accepts the threat of punishment as necessary to ensure 
that adequate attention is paid to the decision-making process. 
The adversarial nature of the justice system serves as a harsh 
sort of study aid, much like the hickory stick of the one-room 
school house. But we need to ask ourselves if such attention -- 
by force — is well-suited to making the kinds of moral choices 
that participants face. 
Burt sidesteps this issue; I would like to examine it 
58 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Translated by H. 
Barnes, New York: Washington Square Press, 1966. 
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directly. It is possible to describe moral choice — outside of 
the ethics of rights — in such a way that emotion and attention 
are organic parts of the decision-making process. Threats are not 
required, for attention is already riveted by the nature of the 
responsibility of choice. 
Burt recognizes that emotionality enters into these 
decisions, yet he remains within the adversary system. The level 
of debate is thereby reduced to moral choice at what Kohlberg 
and Gilligan would agree is an extremely primitive level. It is 
as if moral choice falls into neat halves. It is either all of 
one thing or all of another; it is entirely rational or entirely 
irrational, i.e., emotional. Relations among persons are 
similarly dichotomous; either they are paternalistic, in the 
sense of one party being overpowered by the other, or they are 
individualistic, in the sense of both parties being wholly free 
and unrelated to each other. 
Caroline Whitbeck refers to this kind of attitude as 
"dualism," which she finds throughout the ethics of rights.59 
Whitbeck correctly argues that the dualist approach is not our 
only alternative. It is possible to construct a system which is 
not fundamentally adversarial, and in which attachment and reason 
do not stand as opposites. In such a system, relations among 
persons need be neither paternalistic nor atomistic. This shift 
59 Caroline Whitbeck, "A Different Reality: A Feminist 
Ontology," in Bevond Domination: New Perspectives on Women and 




in the nature of relation changes the nature of moral choice. 
Varieties of Attachment 
An examination of relationship is crucial to our 
understanding of the ethics of responsibility. Let us first 
examine the relation of doctor and patient. We will draw a 
picture in which emotion is notably lacking, and then ask how 
this image differs from reality. 
In this extreme example, the doctor is viewed as a 
business consultant. The patient, in managing his health, 
becomes aware of a problem, yet lacks relevant information. He 
or she then asks the doctor to gather and analyze data, and to 
provide a set of alternative solutions. Thus informed, the 
patient selects one of these options. As in any other business 
decision, considerations such as cost, convenience, and risk are 
factored into the equation. 
There are a number of flaws with this picture of the 
doctor's role. From an empirical point of view, it is not 
possible to achieve such a perfect sharing of information between 
doctor and patient. The doctor's years of experience in 
relevantly similar cases may lead him or her to believe that in 
this particular case, one option surpasses the others, for 
reasons that may prove impossible to fully express. In addition, 
it would be surprising (and inadvisable) in serious matters for a 
doctor to have no preference for one treatment over another. And 
having such a preference, the doctor would no doubt communicate 
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it, however subtly. In the majority of cases, therefore, it 
would be impossible for doctors to present neutrally a list of 
options for the patient to consider. The doctor can not entirely 
avoid the burden of authority, but will to some degree maintain 
the advantage in terms of information; the patient must to that 
extent trust the doctor. 
This matter of trust is interesting, for it has distinctly 
emotional connotations. And if the relation between doctors and 
patients is emotional in this respect, might it not be in others 
as well? Indeed, a host of powerful, although often unspoken 
emotions spring up between doctor and patient. To ignore these 
emotions, or to argue that they ought not to occur, is to belie 
the fact that they do in fact exist, and that they exert an 
impact on the way medical decisions are made. Let us then 
proceed to examine the nature of the attachment between doctor 
and patient. 
The Burden of Responsibility 
If we investigate the feelings of doctors for patients, we 
will discover more subtle relations than mere paternalism. There 
is a sensation that includes more emotional content than is 
generally understood by the phrase "professional responsibility," 
and which is evoked by knowledge of the patient's predicament. 
These feelings may be relieved by a favorable outcome, but become 
more painful when the outcome is poor, regardless of whether or 
not the physician has been at fault. These emotions, which 
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motivate the physician to improve the patient's health, are not 
solely derived from the desire to honor the obligations of the 
implicit contract, or to avoid punishment. In the language of 
psychiatry, these feelings would be described as a form of 
counter-transference. 
One example of this emotionality is the desire to "save" 
patients. This rescue fantasy, perhaps more common among young 
physicians, is most in evidence when most cruelly challenged by 
reality, as when first a patient dies who has been in one's care. 
The sense of failure that arises on such occasions is too 
commonly experienced to be ignored as part of doctors' attachment 
to patients. 
One source of this emotion may be the patient's 
vulnerability. Robert Burt gives illuminating examples of the 
effect of the weak on the strong. He discusses the relationship 
of parent and child, in which the parent has considerable 
authority and power, and yet is often controlled by the demands 
and needs of the child.60 The apparently weaker member of a pair 
is not therefore without certain types of power, for the 
vulnerable can and do make powerful claims upon those responsible 
for them. Thus, though the patient is dependent upon the doctor, 
so is the doctor dependent upon the patient. This 
interdependence of doctor and patient is the most significant 
aspect of the attachment between them. It is an essential 
feature of the ethics of responsibility, yet it is impossible to 
60 Burt, p.66-7. 
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describe within the ethics of rights. 
It may be, as Burt and other authors have argued, that we 
see in the weak our own past helplessness, and even more 
frightening to contemplate, our helplessness that is yet to be. 
It follows that we care for others in the way we hope to be cared 
for. We protect the weak because we can not bear to think of 
ourselves as unprotected. 
More onerous responses to weakness are possible, such as 
avoidance and fear. One may observe on the wards the diminishing 
amounts of time that the health care team spends with patients 
who are known to be dying, and for whom a cure is no longer to be 
attempted. This avoidance is occasionally attributed to the 
desire to allow patients privacy in their last days, but also 
includes a measure of discomfort comprised of guilt and fear. 
Perhaps there is also a degree of helplessness, for when we 
cannot rescue, doctors are often at a loss. 
What Patients Feel 
As patients we learn that feelings toward our doctors can 
cover quite a range of emotions. In some circumstances, we see 
the physician as Virgil to our Dante; they are our guide through 
hell. Unwittingly, we lend strength to the doctor's rescue 
fantasy, by asking to be rescued. Our illusion is supported by 
the mysterious technology with which the doctor is surrounded, 
and by the arcane language he or she understands. This holds true 
even for those who are doctors, for it is entirely possible to 
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find oneself a complete novice when affected by a disease that 
lies outside one's area of expertise. Our admiration for doctors 
is not always, of course, unbounded. Indeed, we may experience 
irritation, anger and disappointment, to a degree usually 
reserved for family members, when doctors fall short of our 
expectations. This strength of emotional response testifies to 
the unusual nature of the bond between doctor and patient. This 
bond arises in part from the doctor's special access to private 
information about the patient. The permission to examine the 
patient's body, and to ask questions which are highly personal 
and potentially embarrassing, is unprecedented even within family 
relationships. 
The Family 
The families of very ill and incompetent patients are in a 
position similar in some ways to that of the doctor. They help 
fulfill the role of protector; they look out for the patient's 
interests when the patient cannot; they may be able to understand 
risks and options that the patient cannot comprehend. In other 
respects, the family becomes like a patient. They are obliged to 
question the doctor, and to participate in decisions in ways that 
competent patients do for themselves. The well-being of the 
family, tied to the health of its members, depends upon the 
doctor. There emerges from this role a strange combination of 
power and powerlessness. 
This role is made all the more complicated by the complex 
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emotions that arise from the illness of a loved one. Among these 
are the more laudable sentiments, such as sympathy for the 
patient's pain, sorrow for the various limitations imposed by 
disability, and even sorrow for one's own potential loss. There 
is also the potential, however, for less praiseworthy sentiments 
to exist, such as resentment of the patient because of his or her 
dependence and the demands made on one because of it, as well as 
anger at the patient who may, as a result of this illness, leave 
the loved one behind. Also, as in the case of doctors, the sight 
of a helpless and suffering patient may cause family members to 
fear their own potentially similar fate. 
Thus we see that not only judges, but patients, families, 
and doctors have emotions which affect the nature of the 
attachments between them and the decisions they make. To 
recognize the existence and the inevitability of emotions, is to 
reject the purported emotional neutrality of legalism. Medical 
ethics does not exist in an emotionally neutral context — nor 
should it. For to deny the emotional content of the attachment 
of the various persons concerned for the patient's welfare is to 
distort the nature of these relations. Indeed, we see that 
emotional neutrality is one aspect of legalism which does not 
"fit" the context of medical dilemmas. As John Ladd has written: 
...the posture of impersonality, which constitutes the 
strength of legalism in one context, is precisely that 
characteristic that renders it dysfunctional in other 
contexts. Medical ethics...is specifically — perhaps 
uniquely — concerned with situations in which impersonal 




separate from each other.61 
Ladd's comment is reminiscent of Gilligan's views on detachment. 
When self and other are not equal, i.e., when one member of a 
pair is dependent on the other, detachment may imply the ability 
"to turn away from need."62 When the law aims at emotional 
neutrality, it distorts the nature of the bonds between us, and 
the responsibilities that arise from them. 
Within the ethics of rights, attachment, particularly as it 
occurs between patients and their families and doctors, cannot be 
adequately described. All relationships in a legalistic system 
are reduced to either contractual obligations or acts of 
generosity which one is not bound to perform. According to Ladd: 
When it comes to personal relationships of a more permanent 
nature, such as those between friends or between members of 
the same family or community, the exhaustive and exclusive 
division of morality into obligatory acts and acts of 
supererogation that typifies an ethics of rights does not 
seem appropriate. The morality of taking care of another 
person with whom one has some kind of personal relationship 
cannot be reduced either to an obligation corresponding to a 
right or to a gratuitous favor.63 
Thus, within the ethics of rights, it is impossible to describe 
responsibility and care, which are central aspects of the 
interdependent relationships between doctor, patient and family. 
In this context, where autonomous individuals demand and grant 
rights to one another, it is impossible to maintain a relation 
that is not contractual in nature. This flaw is particularly 
61 Ladd, p.14. 
62 Gilligan, Different Voice, p.25. 
63 Ladd, p.22. 
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disturbing in its implications for medicine. 
Burt suggests that there would be fewer decisions to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment if incompetent patients were 
considered with more respect. While the fear of retribution may 
well lead to more treatment, such excesses are not synonymous 
with care, but lead instead to "defensive medicine." 
One indication that more treatment does not indicate more 
respect is in the ominous reference to the Cardiac Care Unit as 
the Chi-Chi U, after a disturbing joke which is popular in 
teaching hospitals. According to the joke, two sailors are 
shipwrecked on an island inhabited by savages. Both are thrown 
into a primitive jail. The first is brought before the king and 
asked, "Which do you choose: death or chi-chi?" The puzzled 
prisoner, knowing what death is, chooses chi-chi. Then he is 
dragged about the island, and subjected to a seemingly endless 
series of humiliations and tortures. When at last, near death, 
he is thrown back into the cell along with his fellow prisoner, 
he tells him, "When they ask you to choose death or chi-chi, 
choose death." Shortly thereafter, the second prisoner is 
brought before the king, who asks him the fateful question. 
Having been warned, the second prisoner of course answers, "I 
choose death!" "Right you are," says the king, "but first — 
some chi-chi." 
The implications of the joke are painful, as it is 
translated into the language of the wards. What physicians do to 
patients in the Chi-Chi Unit is not to care for them, but to 
' 
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administer a series of tortures which will postpone, but not 
prevent, death. The same activities are also described 
colloquially as flogging or beating. The point of recounting 
this language is not to chastise the house officers who 
popularize it, and who perform the majority of procedures in 
intensive care units, but to recognize how they view their role. 
There is something about their duties, especially "heroic 
measures," that is not always consistent with the idea of care. 
Perhaps this distortion of the purpose of medicine derives 
from the enormous emphasis placed on technology in medicine and 
in medical education. Along with this overvaluation of 
intervention and cure, even when no longer sustained by hope, 
there seems to be a complementary devaluation of medicines's duty 
to comfort the dying. 
In summary, the legal approach, which has as its foundation 
the ethics of rights, fails to help us in resolving medical 
dilemmas for several reasons. Legalism cannot comprehend the 
nature of attachment, one of interdependence and responsibility, 
within which medical choice is made. The impediments to direct 
communication in the adversarial system prevents us from focusing 
on the patient. For the wholly incompetent patient, the goal of 
maximizing patient autonomy, which is the goal of the ethics of 
rights, is a harmful fiction. By pretending to see the patient 
who depends on us and on whom we depend as isolated, we are 
distracted from the task of understanding our responsibilities 
toward the vulnerable members of our community. 
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Chapter VI: The Ethics of Responsibility 
Principles for Decision-Making 
We have asserted that physicians' decisions must be guided 
by standards that are clear and accessible to public discussion. 
The following is an attempt to describe standards that are 
consistent with the ethics of care. 
Rather than attempting to create formal principles, we will 
begin by accepting as our first principle Kant's categorical 
imperative, namely: "Act so as to treat man, in one's own person 
as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, and never 
merely as a means." The ethics of responsibility consists of 
substantive norms which interpret this principle of respect for 
persons in the context of relationships. The ethics of rights 
also takes as its first principle the categorical imperative. 
) 
However, the ethics of rights uses different substantive norms in 
order to explain the application of this abstract principle. 
What follows is a list of norms for the ethics of responsibility. 
1. Respect for persons demands not only that we refrain from 
harming others, but also that we strive to nurture their human 
capacities. 
2. Human capacities which demand respect include both 
autonomy and relationality. 
3. To respect persons, we must respond to them as they 
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exist, not as we wish they were. 
4. The form of knowledge required in order to respect 
persons flows from both subjective and objective information, 
acquired through "loving attention" (infra). 
5. Moral decisions within the ethics of responsibility 
cannot be made simply by applying rules; such decisions also 
require an understanding of context, and the individuals within 
it. 
For Kant, the categorical imperative means that we must 
treat other persons with respect because of their autonomy. To 
Kant's followers, although not necessarily to Kant, such respect 
has come to imply a negative form of freedom, i.e., the freedom 
to be left alone. Within the ethics of responsibility, respect 
includes positive social cooperation. We must not only keep from 
harming others, we must strive to further the realization of 
their potential. 
This potential that we must nurture is a complex entity, and 
to understand it, we must examine our definition of persons. 
Kant describes autonomy as the foundation of human dignity. 
Margaret Farley builds on this concept by claiming that both 
autonomy and relationality are fundamental human qualities, and 
serve as the basis of our obligation to respect persons.64 
Relationality is the capacity or potential to experience other 
64 Margaret Farley, "Obligating-Features of Personhood," 




persons. Richard McCormick has advanced similar arguments, which 
we shall discuss below.65 
Although we strive to nurture both autonomy and 
relationality, not all persons exhibit both these attributes. 
When we encounter a person who lacks one or both of these 
attributes, it is a violation of respect to ignore this fact of 
their existence and treat them as if they do exhibit the 
attribute. A healthy infant, for instance, lacks autonomy yet 
experiences relation. When beings lack autonomy, yet show 
relational capacity, we respect them by nurturing their 
relational capacity. For instance, when we apply the ethics of 
responsibility to medicine, we see that competent patients may 
choose to assert their autonomy without regard for relationality. 
An incompetent patient, on the other hand, will always have some 
compromise to autonomy, but may still maintain relational 
attributes. For such a patient, we protect relationality; we 
cannot protect autonomy for one who lacks it. 
It is no easy matter to estimate the capacity in a person 
for autonomy and relation. The effort can only be accomplished 
by communication founded in trust, and unfettered by suspicion 
and territorial claims. The necessary information develops 
through the process of loving attention, which is the painstaking 
effort to understand all relevant aspects of the patient's 
experience. We shall consider this concept in more detail 
65 Richard McCormick, "The Quality of Life,The Sanctity of 




In the ethics of responsibility, moral decisions require a 
knowledge of context and of subjective information. Therefore, 
morality cannot be reduced to a system of rules. Nonetheless, we 
can describe standards by which we may evaluate moral decisions, 
and we have listed these in the opening of this section. As our 
discussion continues, we will describe how these standards may be 
applied specifically to medicine. 
A Member of the Community 
The ethics of responsibility draws upon Gilligan's idea of 
the moral decision-maker, and the community in which he or she 
lives. The moral agent does not espouse the extreme form of 
autonomy, but sees him or herself as an integral part of a 
community. 
In the ethics of responsibility, the community is more of a 
sustaining environment than a means of suppressing aggression. 
We will rely upon Durkheim's concept of the "collective 
conscience," which is a "psychic reality" vested with moral 
authority.66 Although Durkheim conceives of this entity as ideal 
and unchanging, I prefer to redefine it as neither innate nor 
infallible. It evolves over time and shifts to a degree within 
segments of society, according to ethnicity, religion, 
generation, and degree of social privilege. The conscience is 
66 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. 
by George Simpson, New York, The Free Press, 1933, (1893), p.78. 
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meant to be seen in a positive light, as a means of determining 
right from wrong, rather than as an instrument for meting out 
censure. 
Rather than highlight the autonomy of individuals, the 
collective conscience emphasizes our interdependence, since we 
all contribute to its formation. We can incorporate this concept 
into an idea of community in which members are encouraged not 
just to stay out of each other's way, but to actively contribute 
to the well-being of all. In the rights model, the community 
resembles a union of states whose members select non-aggression 
as their goal. In the responsibility model, the community is more 
like an organism, which flourishes as a whole to the degree in 
which each component thrives. Responsibility is not what we owe 
to persons by virtue of the rights they may demand of us, but is 
our expression of membership within the community. This vision 
of community fits well with Gilligan's idea of moral maturity. 
For her, maturity is represented by one who integrates the needs 
of the self and of others. For a physician, this would mean 
striving to see clearly the needs of the patient, while not 
pretending to be oneself unaffected by highly emotional 
situations, as when a patient's death is imminent. The physician 
who is thus aware of emotion is not adrift in a sea of bathos, 
but does not ignore the presence of such feelings as sadness and 
pity. 
Gilligan's unique description of the moral agent gives rise 
to a different process of moral choice. As mentioned in chapter 
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IV, Kohlberg depicts moral choice as occurring in an emotional 
vacuum. Any rational being provided with the correct data would 
select the correct choice. The operation does not require 
attachment; indeed, it flourishes in the setting of detachment. 
Gilligan, as well as other writers, argues that detachment is not 
the only way, nor necessarily the best way, to carry out moral 
decision-making. 
Iris Murdoch offers a description of moral choice which 
includes the concept of love, in the form of careful attention. 
In "The Idea of Perfection," Murdoch suggests that moral 
decisions need not be the result of purely rational analysis.67 
Instead, she borrows the concept of loving attention from Simone 
Weil, and shows how it may be part of certain types of moral 
choice. "Love" in this context refers nether to erotic love nor 
to the love of family members for one another. It is closest to 
the concept of "philios," the bond of trust, loyalty, and 
devotion typical of life-long friends. Murdoch explains loving 
attention through the example of a mother-in-law, M, and her 
daughter-in-law, D. M at first sees D as a rather immature 
girl, who lacks refinement and poise. However, M suspects this 
unfavorable judgment may be partially motivated by jealousy. 
Furthermore, she wishes to treat D with respect, since she is 
married to M's son. Over time, M reflects upon D, and encourages 
herself to examine D's attributes carefully, yet respectfully. M 
67 Iris Murdoch, "The Idea of Perfection," in The 
Sovereignty of Good. New York, Schocken Books, 1971. 
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is not dishonest and does not attempt to see D as better than she 
is. She does pay careful attention to the way in which her 
evaluation of D is adversely affected by emotions like jealousy; 
she does not ignore emotion but looks steadfastly upon it, 
acknowledging its power. Through the process of this patient, 
gradual discipline, M learns to see D more clearly, and yet more 
kindly. 
In the above example, Murdoch provides us with an unusual 
description of moral decision-making. She does not present 
choice as something we do all at once and dramatically. On the 
contrary, the subtle art of seeing persons as they are is more 
evident than any overt act. Nor is it possible to extract the 
choice and the persons concerned from their context; the 
relations between them make an enormous difference to the 
situation. Choice is the product of sustained, painstaking 
effort, as in the choice to be respectful to one's daughter-in- 
law. Moral choice is not the calculus of abstract principles, 
but a discernment of the interrelation between subjective and 
objective data, respect and need, and emotion and choice. In 
this sort of decision-making, attention is not a quality that can 
be added, but is an integral part of what makes this choice 
moral. It is precisely this quality of loving attention which is 
appropriate to the resolution of ethical dilemmas in medicine, 
and yet which is prevented by an atmosphere in which the threat 
of punishment looms large. This quality of attention is 
proscribed by the adversarial atmosphere encountered in court, 
' 
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and recommended by George Annas. Yet it is such attention which 
patients deserve from us when we attempt to care for them in 
their most vulnerable moments. 
What Murdoch is describing is a different type of knowledge 
than the type described by Kohlberg. Within the ethics of 
rights, all the necessary knowledge is publicly available. This 
would mean that moral choice in the real world would not be much 
different from that in the Heinz dilemma. One need only reduce 
the problem to its essence and perform the moral calculus to 
arrive at the right answer; any thinker would arrive at the same 
right answer. This description is reminiscent of the "choiceless 
chooser" in law, i.e., the judge who is a computer-like conduit 
of justice. However, according to Gilligan and Murdoch, some 
necessary information will be missing if we rely exclusively on 
this method. Vital knowledge must be acquired by loving 
attention to a specific object, in a specific context. 
On the one hand, Murdoch tells us that morality requires 
attachment, and we observe that doctors and patients do indeed 
form attachments, rather than maintain strict emotional 
neutrality toward each other. On the other hand, attachment is 
not possible within the ethics of rights. Thus, the rights 
context seems not to fit the conditions of decision-making in a 
medical context. 
Gilligan's research subjects resisted the limits imposed by 
hypothetical dilemmas. They hesitated to make general 
pronouncements without knowing the particularities of the 
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individual's circumstances. Subjective information, similar to 
that demanded by Gilligan's research subjects, and tied to the 
ethical, emotional, and personal details of the patient's needs, 
is required in decisions to withhold medical treatment. 
Communication is vital to the proper functioning of the 
ethics of responsibility. The information required is subtle 
and complex, and may only be discerned with the loving attention 
of physician and family. Communication requires time and trust; 
even with these, information may be so emotionally charged that 
it is difficult to share. The emphasis on rights introduces 
adversarial feelings which serve to divide the decision-makers, 
and prevent communication. An emphasis on responsibility unites 
them in the common goal of caring for the patient. 
Learning from Dax 
A patient may be drastically limited in his autonomy, yet 
may nonetheless retain an unlimited capacity to feel pain. Such 
is the situation in the film Pax's Case, which documents the 
actual experiences of a severely burned young man. Although 
mentally competent, Dax was not allowed by his mother or 
physicians to refuse treatment for his burns, a refusal which 
would have resulted in fatal infection. Dax argued that he did 
not want to die, but that the physical and mental pain of 
receiving and anticipating treatment was so excruciating that he 
would rather die than endure it. Those who thwarted Dax's 




temporarily mentally incompetent because of his pain. Dax was 
treated and eventually went on to marry and run a successful 
business. Thus, by "objective criteria" one might argue that 
Dax's pain was worthwhile because of the good outcome. Dax, 
however, disagrees. 
In the final scenes, filmed many years after his accident, 
Dax remains blind and severely limited in his physical abilities. 
He insists that it would have been better to let him refuse 
treatment and die, not because of his current disabilities, but 
because of the pain he endured. He argues compellingly that 
those who elected treatment for him were unable or unwilling to 
believe his statements that his pain was unendurable. He assails 
the logic of those who, since they could not fathom his pain, 
chose to disregard it. From the perspective of care, Dax's 
family and physicians seem to have respected neither his autonomy 
nor his relationality. They not only denied his ability to make 
a rational, independent choice, they destroyed his sense of 
trust, and thus his sense of connection to others. 
Dax's Case is a chilling reminder of the limits of 
communication. We cannot truly understand the subjective 
experience of others, but we are not therefore relieved of the 
burden to try. This applies to the extremely articulate, like 
Dax, but no less to those whose autonomy is even more severely 
compromised, by virtue of mental incompetence. If we are able to 
ignore the coherent verbal pleas of Dax, how much easier is it to 
ignore the desperate gestures of the speechless patient? 
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A more disturbing question is that if Dax, with his clear 
understanding of the future which might await him, rejects his 
current life with pain, what must be the outlook of the patient 
who has no grasp of the purpose of treatment, or of its duration, 
or of the possible good which it may potentiate? 
When we treat patients who are severely incompetent, we 
ought to be very clear about what we offer them, when it is they 
and not we, who pay the price in pain. When the benefit to be 
gained is great, such as a long life free from disease, and with 
the potential for full competence, then we feel justified in 
treating. However, when treatment inflicts pain, and when we 
cannot offer the patient fuller competence, relief from pain, or 
cure, we must reconsider the necessity for treatment. It is our 
good fortune to have a patient like Dax, who survived his 
tragedy, to tell us of our errors and of our cruelty. We must 
heed his admonishments all the more closely, for he stands in the 
place of so many who cannot speak. 
Individual patients and families will gauge differently the 
amount of pain that can be born in exchange for a hoped-for 
benefit, and we must accommodate these variations. However, an 
extraordinary excess of suffering ensues when all patients are 
treated maximally, regardless of a vanishingly small hope for 
improvement. 
Goals for Treatment 
If we choose goals of therapy which are respectful to 
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patients' needs and circumstances, the task of selecting or 
rejecting specific treatments will be clarified. An effort to 
determine such goals has been made in our community, at Yale New 
Haven Hospital (YNHH). The policy on Do Not Resuscitate 
Decisions was the product of a committee appointed in 1978 by 
Samuel Thier, then Chairman of the Department of Medicine. 68 The 
committee made a series of recommendations regarding the 
identification and responsibilities of the attending physician, 
and appropriate communications between health care providers and 
families. The committee also recommended the classification of 
treatment goals into three basic categories. In Class A, 
patients are to receive all appropriate curative interventions 
and maintenance therapies: 
The primary goal is to achieve arrest, remission, or cure 
of the basic disease process. The aims of curative therapy 
take priority over those of functional maintenance, which in 
turn hold a higher priority than those of comforting 
therapy.69 
Most patients, including very ill ones whose diagnosis remains 
uncertain, will fall into this first classification. 
Classification B emphasizes the maintenance of function in 
patients for whom a cure is thought to be unattainable, and is 
also appropriate for competent patients who decline curative 
treatments. The goal of maintaining function supercedes both cure 
and comfort. This class is further subdivided, depending upon 
68 Committee on Policy for DNR Decisions, YNHH, "Report on 
Do Not Resuscitate Decisions," Connecticut Medicine. August, 
1983, Vol. 47, No. 8. 
69 Ibid.. p.479. 
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whether the patient is to be resuscitated in the event of 
cardiopulmonary arrest. 
The final classification is C, in which the goal of comfort 
takes precedence over all others. This goal is suited to those 
for whom not only a cure, but the maintaining of physiologic 
function either can no longer be attained, or is no longer 
desired. 
Of the legal cases we shall discuss, most would not be in 
category A, since the patients suffer lethal diseases for which 
no curative treatment could be proposed. Saikewicz is an 
exception since his doctors claimed to seek remission. In 
general, disputes arose when one party, usually the family, 
wished to treat the patient as if he or she were in class C. The 
legal cases arose from tension between the desire to cure and the 
responsibility to comfort. 
In general, there is a presumption in favor of treatment, 
and this is why most patients are treated according to the goals 
of class A. However, this presumption may not work to the good 
of patients with fatal illnesses, for there are instances when 
treatment for other purposes than comfort is not consistent with 
respect. 
Comfort as the Goal 
The YNHH policy states that comfort is an appropriate 
therapeutic goal for one who is dying. There are, however, 
circumstances where comfort may rightfully be emphasized for 
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patients with fatal diseases, although death need not be 
imminent. 
Margaret Farley, in "Obligating Features of Personhood," 
focuses on the person's capacity for relation.70 Starting with 
Kant's notion that we must show respect for persons, Farley 
questions what it is about persons that is deserving of our 
respect. Previous authors have focused on autonomy, but Farley 
puts forward relationality as equally central to personhood, and 
therefore equally deserving of respect. Therefore, we respect 
persons because they are autonomous, and because they are 
relational. This does not imply that we need no longer respect 
persons who become incapable of relation and/or autonomy. We 
continue to respect and care for them. However, the ways in which 
we respect beings without autonomy or relation are different from 
our ways of responding to competent, relational persons. We 
cannot nurture autonomy and relation that no longer exist. We 
can strive to minimize pain and fear. The patient afflicted with 
a fatal illness, excluded by profound incompetence from both 
autonomy and relation, need not be forced to undergo painful 
procedures to extend biologic life. This stance would justify 
the removal of a respirator from an irreversibly unconscious 
patient, for instance. 
Richard McCormick addresses this problem in a similar 
fashion by discussing the patient's potential, specifically the 
potential to participate in the life of the community. He 




...life is not a value in and of itself....It is a value to 
be preserved precisely as a condition for other 
values...Since these values cluster around and are rooted in 
human relationships, it seems to follow that life is a value 
to be preserved only insofar as it contains some 
potentiality for human relationships.71 
Thus, it is not life per se which has unconditional value, but 
the experiences which it makes possible. When we are confronted 
with a patient whose life holds no further potential, we must 
consider gravely whether we must pursue the extension of biologic 
life. What do we offer this patient in exchange for his pain? 
He cannot understand hope; he cannot understand the ratio of 
benefit to burden. The majority of such patients, however, 
continue to feel pain. 
To refuse a life-sustaining treatment for an incapacitated 
patient need not mean the devaluing of that patient. Rather than 
an infringement of their autonomy, it is a recognition of their 
ineluctable dependence and vulnerability, and of our 
responsibility to care for them. As Father McCormick says: 
While speaking in terms of 'every life' being of 'equal 
value' reveals a legitimate concern, (that medical treatment 
not be denied or withheld in a way violative of the rights 
of individuals) that is not the issue. Every person is of 
equal value. But not every life....72 
When Father McCormick refers to a patient whose life has no 
further potential, he — like Margaret Farley — concentrates on 
the relational capacity of the patient. Among those whose with 
71 Richard McCormick, "To Save or Let Die," JAMA. July 8, 
1974, p.175. 
72 McCormick, "Quality of Life..., ii p. 35. 
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no further potential for relation are the irreversibly 
unconscious. An emphasis on comfort would be appropriate for 
these unfortunate beings, even if death is not imminent. 
Under what circumstances may patients who are neither 
irreversibly unconscious nor competent be cared for with comfort 
as the primary goal? Let us imagine a person whose communication 
skills are so limited that he or she is not able to understand 
the purpose of a medical intervention, nor its associated risks 
and benefits. Imagine that this person has a fatal illness, for 
which no curative therapy exists. The therapy in question, 
therefore, would necessarily be one that maintains biologic 
function or extends life, but could neither cure nor cause 
remission. Such extensions of biologic life may sometimes be 
considerable in duration, as for example, in Quinlan's case. 
Such a person would lack autonomy, yet might still retain 
relational capacity. In order to uphold the principle of respect 
for persons, therefore, we would need to protect relationality, 
perhaps by nurturing the patient's ability to trust. To 
administer painful and mysterious treatments to this incompetent 
patient would undermine trust, and therefore respect. If a 
therapy is known to be significantly painful or debilitating, it 
is legitimate to withhold such therapy. An example of such a 
circumstance would be the rejection of chemotherapy for Joseph 
Saikewicz. 
For therapies which are not generally believed to be unduly 
painful, physicians in consultation with families might 
.FI 
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legitimately begin such treatments. However, should the 
individual patient express — in whatever way he or she can — 
that the therapy is either physically or mentally painful, then 
treatment may be terminated. The rejection of surgery to 
reimplant a gastrostomy tube for ninety-two year old Mrs. Hier is 
an example in this category. The court rejected surgery for her 
not only because of the risk and pain of surgery, but also 
because simply having a gastrostomy tube in place was painful to 
Mrs. Hier. 
The preceding argument assumes that the physician and family 
have determined that comfort should be the primary goal of 
therapy. Therefore, specific treatments are accepted or rejected 
on the basis of the amount of pain they cause. Some of these 
painless treatments could conceivably also be therapies which 
extend biologic life. Thus, we have accounted only for pain 
caused by medical interventions, and not for that associated with 
the patient's basic disease process, or with his or her very 
existence. A significant number of seriously ill patients, 
however, will suffer severe, chronic pain, for instance from 
metastatic cancer. For these patients, once we have chosen 
comfort as the therapeutic goal, we may responsibly decide not to 
continue or initiate any treatment that extends biologic life, 
even if the treatment itself causes no additional pain. Thus, the 
patient's condition is such that any efforts to extend biologic 
life would not be consistent with the goal of comfort. An 




antibiotics to pre-existing intravenous lines, in a patient with 
an acute infection atop a chronically painful, incurable disease. 
The treatment would not in itself be painful, except by 
prolonging the patient's agonizing life. 
Within this system, there is no philosophical difference 
between withholding and withdrawing therapy. Specifically, there 
is no obligation to continue a therapy once its benefits no 
longer outweigh its burdens. Furthermore, no types of therapy 
are granted special status. Any therapy which can inflict pain, 
which includes all those dependent upon the insertion of needles 
and catheters, may be terminated. If necessary to maximize 
comfort, it is permissible to withdraw antibiotics, respirators, 
blood products, and in special circumstances, nutrition. 
Within the ethics of responsibility, we hope to encourage care 
that is consistent with respect. For those incompetent patients 
in whom significant improvement can no longer be expected, and 
for whom treatments cause substantial pain, including fear, we 
may morally decide to support comfort rather than biologic 
function, by withdrawing a painful, life-sustaining treatment. 
This does not imply that we abandon the patient, or that we 
withdraw all treatment. However, if the painful treatment is 
life-sustaining, death may come sooner as a result of its 
termination. This result is preferable to a brief extension of 




Chapter VII: John Storar 
Facts of the Case 
A major goal of the ethics of responsibility is to make 
decisions for incompetent patients according to principles that 
are at once more clear and more kind. We will examine the 
dilemma of one seriously incapacitated patient, discuss the legal 
decision that resulted, and then consider what alternatives might 
have been preferable. 
John Storar, when he came to the attention of the courts, 
was a severely retarded 52 year old man.73 He had a mental age 
of about 18 months. Although he was unable to speak, he 
communicated by means of grunts and gestures; he had been 
institutionalized at age five at the Newark Developmental Center 
in New York state. For John, institutionalization had not meant 
abandonment by his family, for his 77 year old mother continued 
to visit him, her only child, daily. Notably, John was cared for 
in an institutional setting by a group of physicians; no one 
doctor had primary responsibility for him. 
In July, 1979, physicians at the facility noted blood in 
John's urine. After getting permission from Mrs. Storar, they 
conducted appropriate tests and discovered cancer of the bladder. 
John was treated with radiation therapy, to which his mother, as 
73 In the Matter of John Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64; 52 N.Y.2d 
363 (1981). 

his legally appointed guardian, consented. After six weeks of 
radiation therapy, the cancer was in remission. 
89 
John was relatively well until the following March, when his 
doctors once again noted hematuria. An unsuccessful attempt was 
made to cauterize the lesions in his bladder, in an effort to 
stop the bleeding. After the failure of this therapy, the 
physicians determined that John's cancer was "terminal," i.e., 
that he would die of it despite further medical or surgical 
intervention. 
By May, John had gradually lost enough blood so that his 
doctors asked permission to transfuse him. Mrs. Storar at first 
refused, but then acquiesced. John received transfusions 
regularly until mid-June, by which point he required two units of 
blood every one to two weeks. On June 19, Mrs. Storar asked that 
the transfusions be discontinued; she insisted that they were 
extremely unpleasant to John, and that they served "only [to] 
prolong his discomfort."74 His physicians claimed that the 
transfusions were necessary, and went to court in order to get 
permission to transfuse John over the objections of his legal 
guardian. 
A hearing was held in September, by which time the cancer 
had metastasized to John's lungs, and "perhaps to other 
organs."75 At that point, physicians estimated that John would 
live another two to six months. 
74 Ibid.. p.260. 
75 Ibid.. p.271. 
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The case traversed several levels of the New York state 
judicial system. In March, 1981, The Court of Appeals handed 
down what has stood as the final decision. The Appeals Court 
reversed the lower court, asserting that the physicians were 
correct, and that John should be transfused. Although he had, of 
course, continued to receive blood pending the appeal, John had 
died some months before this decision was announced. 
In writing for the majority. Judge Wachtler based his 
opinion on certain factors. He asserted that John was 
functioning at "his usual level of mental and physical activity" 
with transfusions, that they did not cause excessive pain, and 
that he therefore ought to receive blood despite his mother's 
objections. Judge Wachtler conceded, as did all parties, that 
John objected to the transfusions. After receiving blood, John 
frequently passed large clots in his urine, and these were 
frightening to him, as well as painful. Judge Wachtler noted 
with approval that, although John displayed anxiety about his 
transfusions, this was treated with sedatives before the 
procedure. 
Judge Wachtler does not comment, as Judge Jones did in the 
dissenting opinion, on John's increasing discomfort and hostility 
during the procedure, which had recently led to the use of 
physical restraints during the transfusions. Further, the 
dissenting Judge Jones noted that although John was physically 
still able to perform such activities as bathing himself, he was 
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far more withdrawn, and "ventured outside his room 
infrequently."76 Thus, in deciding that John did not require 
transfusion. Judge Jones is swayed by his different 
interpretation of the "facts" of the case. He finds that John 
did not function at his usual level, and that the transfusions, 
while perhaps not "excessively" painful in a physical sense, were 
far from a minor intervention. Upon closer examination, we shall 
see that more than the facts of the case are debatable; we shall 
have cause to question the neutrality of the court, as well as 
its very suitability for deciding such matters. 
A Fair Comparison? 
In considering the dilemma of John Storar and those 
concerned with his care, Judge Wachtler naturally sought for 
precedents. The major precedents, however, were not cases 
involving retarded adults, but a series of cases involving 
infants. As the judge explained, "Mentally John Storar was an 
infant and that is the only realistic way to assess his rights in 
this litigation."77 This is a new twist on a disturbing yet 
familiar theme. 
The judge, unable to fathom what ought to be done with 
someone in John's unenviable situation, reduces the complexity of 
the problem by imagining John's situation to be otherwise. His 
tactic is therefore similar to that used in the Saikewicz case, 
76 Ibid., p.280. 
77 Ibid.. p.275. 
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in which we are asked to imagine Saikewicz as magically competent 
for an instant, yet expecting to return to his life of profound 
retardation and life-threatening cancer. In both instances we are 
asked to turn our eyes away from the patient as he really is, and 
from the problem formulated as it actually is. In so doing, we 
refute the standards of the ethics of responsibility, which 
require us to see the individual accurately, in context, and 
through the lens of loving attention. As we shall see, details 
specific to John Storar's dilemma are lost in this process, 
substantiating the misgivings expressed by Carol Gilligan on the 
use of hypothetical examples. Certainly there is much to be 
learned by comparing any current problem with similar ones 
encountered previously. Problems arise, however, when one 
attempts to compare dissimilar instances. 
A careful examination of Storar's status reveals that he is 
like an infant in one way, but dissimilar in many other respects. 
The obvious basis for the comparison is Storar's "mental age," a 
concept meant to indicate the retarded person's competence in a 
number of basic areas, such as speech or abstract thought. 
Storar's mental age is estimated at 18 months. We read, however, 
that he is able to bathe himself but not to speak, an odd 
combination for a "normal" 18 month old child. Storar is not 
atypical in this regard, for mental age is not meant to be taken 
literally; a severely retarded 52 year old person is not 




The most obvious and the saddest way in which Storar differs 
from a typical toddler is, of course, that the limits to his 
physical and mental capacity are not temporary. Indeed, one of 
the most salient characteristics of such young children is the 
speed at which they learn and change. John's few skills had been 
hard won. It took him fifty years to acquire them; his potential 
for further development is curtailed, by both his life-long 
retardation and his cancer. Thus, a profound difference between 
John and a healthy child is that only one has the potential for 
growth, and the possibility of becoming competent. 
Judge Wachtler ignored these differences and decided that 
John was like an infant. He then based his opinion on a series 
of famous cases involving infants who required blood 
transfusions, i.e., children with erythroblastosis fetalis who 
were born to Jehovah's Witnesses.78 Infants afflicted with this 
disease have red blood cells that are incompatible with those of 
their mother. When fetal cells enter the maternal circulation, 
the mother's blood becomes sensitized and forms antibodies 
capable of destroying the infant's blood cells. When these 
antibodies cross the placenta and enter the baby's circulation, 
massive numbers of red blood cells may be destroyed, and the baby 
may become severely, perhaps fatally, anemic. Infants have a 
limited ability to remove the products of blood cell degradation; 
78 See, for example, "Application of the President and 
Directors of Georgetown College," 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), 
certiorari denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); and D.C.Court of Appeals 
Ruling, November, 1974, regarding Janet P. 
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if toxic levels accumulate, the child can suffer severe brain 
damage. A mainstay of therapy for severe forms of the disease is 
to replace the child's damaged blood cells with ones compatible 
with the antibody, and therefore not subject to attack. If 
detected early, treatment is highly effective, and indeed, many 
healthy adults are alive today who survived this disease in 
infancy. 
Treatment becomes difficult, however, when these infants are 
born to Jehovah's Witnesses, who object to transfusions. In a 
series of cases involving both children with erythroblastosis 
fetalis and adult Witnesses who required transfusion, the courts 
have established that a parent may refuse blood products for him 
or herself, but not for an infant. Among the reasons cited for 
this distinction, is that all persons ought to have an 
opportunity to fulfill their potential, and to become autonomous, 
competent adults. In this case, a child should be allowed to 
grow up and choose his own religion before he is allowed to die 
in keeping with its tenets. 
Transfusions for John Storar, however, are radically 
different than transfusions for an infant with erythroblastosis 
fetalis. For the infants, the transfusion is curative. The 
child, by virtue of this treatment, once again has the potential 
to live a life which is normal in duration and unhampered by 
severe illness. In light of the great benefit to be gained, and 
the great harm to be avoided, the courts have determined that the 





is preferable to the consequences of not treating. In this way, 
the court protects the child's capacity for autonomy. 
Storar, however, will receive no equivalent benefit. For 
him, transfusion is not curative, but merely palliative. In 
forcing upon him treatment which neither he nor his parent 
desires, we are not able to do so knowing that the reward to him 
will be a long healthy life. On the contrary, he may be expected 
to die within two to six months, despite our intervention. 
Neither are we preserving for him the opportunity for future 
autonomy. He has never been and never will be competent. We are 
not waiting for John Storar to grow up. Thus, in significant 
respects, Storar is not like an infant, and transfusion for him 
means something entirely different than it does for the infant 
with erythroblastosis fetalis. Judge Wachtler reasoned within 
the ethics of rights, and so strove to protect autonomy. 
However, John lacked this capacity. By the norms of 
responsibility, Judge Wachtler failed to respect John, for he did 
not respond to qualities which John had, but to ones which the 
judge wished he had. 
Setting the Standard 
The use of the Jehovah's Witness precedent is not the only 
disturbing feature of the case. The decision for Storar was 
handed down in tandem with that on Brother Fox, which we have 
discussed previously (chapter II). Judge Wachtler meant to draw a 
sharp distinction between the two cases, since he decided that 
, 
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termination of treatment was appropriate in the case of Brother 
Fox, but not in the case of Storar. The substitute judgment 
standard was pivotal for Judge Wachtler in making the 
distinction. He states that: 
clear and convincing proof...is required where it is 
claimed that a person, now incompetent, left instructions to 
terminate life sustaining procedures when there is no hope 
of recovery.79 
As we have seen, Brother Fox was in the fortunate, although 
extremely rare, position of having left "clear and convincing" 
indications of his wishes. He had expressed his beliefs 
repeatedly, unambiguously, and in the context of a serious 
discussion of moral values; and had reaffirmed his statements 
shortly before his final hospitalization. For all these reasons, 
Brother Fox's case demonstrates exactly the correct circumstances 
for the use of substitute judgment; we know what he would do if 
he could choose. Brother Fox is, of course, unusual in having 
established while competent such a clear representation of his 
beliefs. 
Having determined that clear and convincing proof is 
required for proxy decision-making, Judge Wachtler then presents 
us with a fascinating inconsistency in his logic. He cites 
approvingly the District Attorney's claim that any patient's 
right to refuse treatment is "entirely personal" and may not be 
exercised by a third party once the patient becomes incompetent. 
Although the judge purports to agree with this dubious argument, 
79 In the Matter of Philip Eichner, on behalf of Joseph Fox, 
opinion combined with Storar, p.267. 
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he nonetheless allows the incompetent Brother Fox to forego 
treatment. He reconciles the contradiction by claiming that it 
is really Brother Fox himself who refused treatment, and that the 
judge is just carrying out his orders. In this interesting 
fiction, we see again Burt's "choiceless chooser." The judge 
denies that it is he who decides; he is merely a functionary 
carrying out the directives of a now silent, yet somehow still 
autonomous agent. Were he acting within the ethics of 
responsibility, it might be easier for him to acknowledge his 
role as a decision-maker. He would then consider the relevant 
subjective data, which in this case unequivocally reveals the 
meaning of the treatment, artificial respiration in the setting 
of irreversible coma, to the patient. This caring judge would 
see that the responsible decision was to withdraw the treatment. 
As it is, Judge Wachtler shields himself from the weighty 
responsibility of decision. He invents autonomy where none 
exists, and bows before it. 
Unfortunately, most people who pass from lucidity into 
mental incompetence are not like Brother Fox, and will never have 
expressed their beliefs on these issues. For them, the use of 
substitute judgment becomes problematic. We can, for instance, 
rely on inference by examining the official views of their 
religion, if any, knowing that an individual may or may not agree 
with all the tenets of his faith. By careful investigation, we 
may thus learn enough about some once-competent patients to make 
the substitute judgment standard tenable for them. 
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But what of those who have never been competent? A man like 
John Storar has never had the opportunity to clearly and 
convincingly express any reasoned opinion. Judge Wachtler 
therefore correctly hesitates to use the substitute judgment 
standard for Storar. However, he proposes no alternative 
standard which might be more suitable. Specifically, he ignores 
the best interest standard, which does not require that the 
patient was once competent nor that he expressed his beliefs on 
this issue. 
The omission of the best interest standard is telling, for 
it allows the judge to ignore life-long incompetence in patients 
like Storar. The unhappy result is that in Judge Wachtler's 
formulation, there is no means by which treatment may be 
terminated for a patient like John Storar. In the words of George 
Annas, the court "effectively deprives incompetents of any 
'right to refuse treatment' and 'forces' them to be treated under 
all circumstances."80 Having been denied mental competence by a 
cruel accident of Nature, Storar is now to be denied by law the 
option of foregoing treatment. If this decision is to be taken 
literally, then not only Storar, but every never-competent 
patient in New York state must always be treated maximally. 
Professor Annas attempts to limit the damage by suggesting 
that we interpret the decision "narrowly," i.e., that we ignore 
its full scope and assume, although Judge Wachtler never says as 
80 George Annas, "Help From the Dead: The Cases of Brother 
Fox and John Storar," Hastings Center Report. June, 1981. p.20. 
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much, that it is meant to apply only to questions of 
transfusion.81 Although this interpretation decreases the scope 
of the disaster, it does nothing to make the decision more 
rational. Why, if it is permissible sometimes to remove a 
respirator, must we always transfuse? We shall return to this 
question below, in the section on subjectivity. 
What lesson may we derive from the history of John Storar? 
We see that misfortune befalls those who are not like others. 
Judge Wachtler suggests that since Storar is incompetent, he must 
be like a healthy infant. On the other hand, he is an adult, and 
therefore must be like someone who was competent, and so had the 
opportunity to express views about health care. The result of 
this distorted thinking is a decision that might be appropriate 
for a Jehovah's witness infant, or a once-competent adult, like 
Brother Fox. Never does Judge Wachtler suggest a remedy for 
someone who is just like John Storar. Storar was not able to 
give us instructions for his care, and Judge Wachtler is 
unwilling to accept the responsibility of deciding for him. The 
result is a non-decision. Patients like Storar must always be 
treated maximally; there is no option to temper their treatment 
with care. Judge Wachtler, reasoning in the ethics of rights, 
has found a rule and applied it. He has flouted the norms of 
responsibility, however, by not perceiving how subjective 




The Realm of the Subjective 
Judge Jones, as noted previously, dissented from the 
majority and decided that Storar need not have been transfused. 
His reasons for disagreeing are most interesting. For one, he 
does not accept the "facts" of the case. As stated by the 
majority, these are that the transfusions did not cause 
"excessive" pain, and that Storar was functioning at his usual 
mental and physical level. Let us address first the question of 
whether or not Storar was functioning at his usual level. Judge 
Jones, in his dissenting summary of the facts, notes first of all 
that doctors knew Storar would die from his cancer in two to six 
months. He goes on to discuss the severe pain which metastatic 
bladder cancer entails, and notes that John was on chronic pain 
medication, for which his requirements were steadily increasing 
as his disease progressed. Furthermore, although John had long 
required extra sedation before transfusion, during more recent 
episodes his discomfort had increased, and he had also required 
physical restraints to prevent his pulling out the needle. Judge 
Jones also stressed that even when not being transfused, John had 
become more withdrawn, and "stayed far more in his room."82 
Taking all these factors into consideration, it is hard to see 
how the majority of the court found John to be functioning at his 
"usual" level. They seem to have disregarded the impact of 
chronic pain and chronic pain medication, as well as the 
patient's increasing withdrawal, a possible result of the 
82 Storar, p.280. 
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unaccustomed use of physical restraints, and the visitation upon 
him of a repeated, bewildering and painful procedure. 
How could Judge Wachtler and his colleagues have ignored the 
changes in John, which Judge Jones had sensitively pointed out? 
They have chosen to ignore subjective aspects of John's state, 
such as his withdrawal, and concentrate instead on the less 
troubling and more objective matters of his intellectual and 
physical skills. Finding that John is still able to bathe 
himself, and that he cooperated with his nurse in lowering his 
pajama bottoms before an injection, they decide that he is 
functioning at his "usual" level. In other words, pain, fear and 
depression seem not to be important to Judge Wachtler in 
assessing the patient's state; he is concerned only with 
emotionally neutral "objective" measures. No wonder that Mrs. 
Storar came to a different conclusion. In the words of Judge 
Jones it was she who over John's lifetime; 
had come to know and sense his wants and needs and was 
acutely sensitive to his best interests,...[and] had 
provided more love, personal care, and affection for John 
than any other person or institution, and was closer to 
feeling what John was feeling than anyone else....83 
Not surprisingly, John's mother found subjective criteria to be 
much more compelling than did Judge Wachtler in determining 
John's level of function. Although in his dissent Judge Jones did 
not find the patient's pain to be "excessive," one might argue 





We must also recall that a procedure, or the pain associated 
with it, may have a very different meaning for different 
patients. We have discussed the ways in which transfusions for 
John differed from those for infants with erythroblastosis 
fetalis. We might also examine the ways in which transfusions 
for a severely retarded adult are dissimilar from those for other 
adults. In general, a transfusion for an adult is not extremely 
painful. For John, however, the procedure was more complicated. 
He had no way of understanding what was being done, or why. He 
would simply be periodically subjected to the insertion of a 
large gauge needle, and then be required to remain relatively 
immobile, without touching the needle, for a period of time that 
would seem lengthy to one with the mental age of eighteen months. 
When he expressed pain, he was not released, but rather was 
physically restrained. This example reminds us that when we try 
to determine the extent of pain for a particular patient during a 
procedure, it is not enough to know what most patients feel under 
similar conditions. We must try as best we can to discover what 
this patient feels. Given his extreme bewilderment, and the 
subtle changes in his state, I would argue that John's pain was 
considerably more than was conceded by the court. Although not 
in and of itself enough to require the termination of the 
transfusions, pain, both mental and physical, should have been 
more significant in the majority's decision. In the ethics of 
responsibility, such subjective information would have been 
central to the debate. 
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Interestingly, Judge Wachtler does not tell us whether or 
not he would have decided differently if the procedure had 
involved "excessive" pain. He relegates to a footnote the 
comment: 
Whether the presence or absence of excessive pain would be 
determinative with respect to the continuation of a life 
sustaining measure need not be reached under the facts of 
this case.84 
From this statement we derive no clear idea of the circumstances 
under which Judge Wachtler would grant relief to a suffering 
patient by allowing the discontinuation of an invasive procedure. 
One has the impression, however, that such circumstances would be 
rare indeed. 
Judge Wachtler did not, however, completely eschew 
subjective factors in his reasoning. A close look at his 
language reveals subtle yet significant emotional content in some 
key phrases. For instance, Wachtler tells us that: 
...as one of the experts noted, transfusions are analogous 
to food — they would not cure cancer, but could eliminate 
the risk of death from other treatable causes.85 
This statement is noteworthy in a number of ways. The expert 
quoted is a physician, but the opinion expressed is not strictly 
speaking a medical one. Instead, it is a highly subjective 
statement. Judge Wachtler seems not to have noticed this 
migration from the technical to the philosophical, and accepts 







discover that the statement conceals two covert and highly 
questionable assumptions. These are, first, that food and 
transfusions are alike; and second, that feeding is always 
obligatory. 
Thus, this physician draws in an uncritical fashion upon the 
symbolic significance of food. On a very basic level we 
associate being fed with being taken care of. For this reason, 
the termination of feeding in the critically ill, for instance 
through intravenous lines and gastrostomy tubes, remains 
controversial today. The courts have been much quicker to permit 
the termination of ventilatory support, antibiotics and other 
measures considered strictly medical, than they have been to 
allow the termination of feeding. However, as Lynn and Childress 
have pointed out, there are circumstances in which it is ethical 
to withhold food for the terminally ill, and a number of such 
cases have recently been decided in favor of termination.86 
From his comments on food, and from his decision, we must 
assume not only that Judge Wachtler believes food always to be 
necessary-/ but that transfusions fit into this same magical 
category. In that case, it is not surprising he would decide 
that patients must always be transfused. 
Should we place transfusions in a special category, as 
treatments that must always be given? The judge uses some 
86 Joanne Lynn and James Childress, "Must Patients Always 
Be Given Food and Water," Hastings Center Report. October, 1983, 
pp. 17-21. For appropriate cases, see In the Matter of Mary 
Hier, 18 Mass. App 200 (1984), and In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 
453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983). 
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emotionally loaded language to reveal his opinion on the matter. 
He writes of the patient "bleeding to death," and suggests that 
such a thing cannot be permitted because "someone, even someone 
as close as a parent or sibling, feels that this is best for one 
with an incurable disease."87 It is ironic that the patient was 
just as dead when he died from his metastatic cancer, having 
received his transfusions to the last, sedated and restrained. 
The point is not that treatment should routinely be withheld 
from fatally ill patients. On the contrary, we must extend 
ourselves to do all we can to offer appropriate therapy for these 
patients. The problem is rather that the law is an extremely 
clumsy tool. Its processes are slow and inflexible, a point 
which even those who advocate extensive judicial intervention 
into medical dilemmas will concede. Furthermore, the law does 
not deliver the promised benefits of objectivity. It is blind to 
some important subjective matters, such as the meaning of a 
procedure to a particular patient. It is also unwittingly 
subjective when it determines, without analysis, that 
transfusions and food are both magically important therapies, 
which may not be withheld under any circumstances. 
The dissenting Judge Jones is a most eloquent spokesman when 
he summarizes the flaws of the Storar decision, and of judicial 
intervention in general: 
[This]...problem is one which the judicial system is 
unsuited and ill-equipped to solve and which should not 
usually be made the subject of judicial attention...The 
87 Storar, p.275. 
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methodology and techniques of our classic adversary system 
are not best suited to the resolution of the issues 
presented. The courts can claim no particular competence to 
reach the difficult ultimate decision, depending as it 
necessarily must not only on medical data, but on 
theological tenets and perceptions of human values which 
defy classification and calibration....88 
Thus, Judge Jones stands in direct opposition to George Annas on 
the merits of judicial expertise. With this recommendation, let 
us leave behind the legal system and its ethics of rights, and 
consider what benefits might have befallen John Storar had his 
dilemma been considered within the ethics of responsibility. 
A Responsible Solution 
By reasoning within the ethics of responsibility, we hope to 
devise for John Storar a solution which is both kinder and more 
clearly analyzed. What follows is a speculative account of what 
might have been, had the ethics of responsibility predominated in 
this case. 
First, we will discuss the lack of clarity which permeated 
this dilemma. Thorough communication between parties is one 
essential element of the ethics of responsibility which seems to 
have been lacking. Although we cannot know directly what efforts 
were made at communication, there is considerable indirect 
evidence that these efforts were insufficient and ineffective. 
Significantly, we learn that John had not one, but a team of 
physicians supervising his treatment. This fact is revealed in a 
footnote, by way of explaining why an institution and not an 
88 Ibid.. p.277. 
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individual is named as a party in the case. The fact that no one 
person was John Storar's doctor may have had an extremely 
detrimental impact on communication. This possibility is 
recognized in the YNHH guidelines, by the insistence that a 
single physician be designated as the responsible party for each 
patient. In this case, we wonder who Mrs. Storar went to with 
her questions, her fears, and her invaluable knowledge of John. 
Which doctor devoted to John "loving attention," by spending time 
with him, by reflecting on his particular needs, and by learning 
about him from his mother? What information did the doctors lose 
by not establishing such relationships with the patient and his 
mother? I do not suggest that these were "bad" doctors, but that 
diffused responsibility differs from that which is primary and 
personal. 
What evidence do we have that communication between these 
doctors and Mrs. Storar was poor? On an intuitive level, we 
suspect that good communication decreases the number of court 
cases. Where families make clear their desires and doctors make 
clear the medical possibilities, and where both are willing to 
focus on the needs of the patient more than the need to control 
the situation, it is often possible to work out solutions without 
judicial intervention. In this case, however, there is stronger 
evidence than this that communication was less than adequate. 
Judge Wachtler offers the following disturbing account of Mrs. 
Storar's testimony: 
She admitted that no one had ever explained to her what 
might happen to him if the transfusions were stopped. She 
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also stated that she was not 'sure' whether he might die 
sooner if the blood was not replaced....89 
There are various possible explanations of this supposed gap in 
Mrs. Storar's understanding of the problem. Perhaps the 
physicians did explain to Mrs. Storar, but did so using language 
that she could not understand. Perhaps they explained clearly, 
and she repressed this unwelcome information. Or, she may have 
become so angry that she no longer believed what the doctor's 
told her. Alternatively, she may have known the truth, but have 
refused to baldly state to the judge that she knew her actions 
might shorten her son's life. Finally, it is possible that as 
Judge Wachtler suggests, the doctors simply never told her what 
might happen if the transfusions stopped, and why therefore they 
felt strongly about continuing them. It is almost beyond belief, 
but it is possible that these doctors went to court rather than 
discuss the possibility of death in a patient with metastatic 
cancer. 
In fact, it seems unlikely that Mrs. Storar truly did not 
know the trade-off that was under consideration. Her later 
statements indicate that her insistence upon John's comfort was 
so great that she didn't care what might happen if the treatments 
stopped. Still, the possibility exists that this case might 
never have come to court if the physicians had clearly explained 
the medical options. 
It would be unfair to suggest that only Mrs. Storar was 
89 Ibid.. p.272. 
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lacking in information. It was from physician testimony that 
Judge Wachtler determined that John was functioning at his usual 
level. Although Mrs. Storar and at least one other witness 
disagreed, their statements about John's condition seem not to 
have been clearly heard. Perhaps assessments of such subjective 
matters as depression and trust were not deemed to be important. 
Unfortunately, by excluding such subjective information, we 
see that the court lost sight of the details that made this case 
unique. The judge forces on this severely ill man a solution 
originally designed for healthy infants. More disturbing, the 
decision fails to take into account the fluidity of a patient's 
condition. No limitations are imposed on the requirement to 
transfuse. There is no discussion of what options are open 
should John's blood loss increase in rate, or for when he is 
clearly in his last few days of life. The implication is that 
there is never to be a time when it is acceptable to the court 
that comfort should be the goal of John's therapy. 
Such rigidity seems lacking in feeling in the decision for 
this profoundly vulnerable man. The goals of his treatment 
should have been revised in keeping with the ethics of 
responsibility. Indeed, it appears that this is what his mother 
was trying to do. When his first symptoms appeared, she and the 
medical team agreed on the proper course to take. John had a 
battery of diagnostic tests. He then travelled to a separate 
facility to receive his series of radiation therapy treatments. 
His bladder was cauterized, and he received transfusions over a 
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six week period. It was after all these treatments, when his 
illness was conceded to be "terminal," that Mrs. Storar attempted 
to shift the focus of John's treatment from cure to comfort. She 
saw him as dying, although realizing the process might take as 
long as six months, and she wanted him to be comfortable. 
The physicians seemed more concerned about what the patient 
would die from. In their view, his life was at risk from both 
cancer and hematuria, and they could make certain he did not die 
from hematuria. They could not, however, keep him alive. By 
this odd formulation, treatment becomes its own rationale. We 
treat what we can treat, and a low hematocrit is corrected with 
blood replacement. The larger goal of this treatment, however, 
seems not to have been clearly addressed by the physicians. Did 
they intend to extend biological life as long as possible, 
regardless of the patient's circumstances? Did they examine 
whether such an intent was motivated by technical, ethical or 
legal concerns? To what extent did they hear and respect Mrs. 
Storar's wish to shift the goal of treatment? 
Our discussion of these matters must be speculative. We do 
not know if they were ever asked, let alone answered. Judging 
from the decision, and the stated reasons for it, we must assume 
that the court and the doctors acted in a way that they thought 
would protect the patient's rights. Since the patient was not 
competent to exercise any right, the effect was to prevent his 
mother from making a choice for him that would preclude other 
choices. For healthy children, we can by this method preserve 
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their right to make future choices. For John Storar, the result 
was the brief extension of a life that was confusing and painful. 
As the patient became more frightened and withdrawn, it is 
hard to see how his rights and autonomy were strengthened. More 
apparent is the disservice to his relationship to his community. 
For John, his trust and sense of security are undermined as he 
approaches death. For his mother, her sense of protectiveness 
for her dying son is shattered, for she cannot give him the help 
he asks of her. Thus, the effort to protect John's rights did 
not make him free to enjoy his autonomy, for that he could never 
be. He was, however, a member of our community, able to form 
relationships and to trust; in this, he was like a child. And 
yet we were able to destroy this trust before he died, and that 
is the real tragedy of John Storar's dilemma. 
The patient deserves our respect no less for his autonomy 
than for his relation to our community. The destruction of this 
relation is what we hope to prevent by bringing medical decisions 
into the ethics of responsibility. 
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
We have attempted to answer two questions: how decisions 
for incompetent patients are made, and how they ought to be made. 
When we investigated the first question, we found that most 
medical ethicists rely on the legal model, with its emphasis on 
emotional neutrality, detachment, and objective information. As 
we looked more closely, however, we discovered that this model 
was inadequate. We uncovered a complex web of emotional, non¬ 
contractual relationships which link doctors, patients and 
families, making the pose of neutrality a false one. 
Dissatisfaction with the legal model in resolving medical 
dilemmas exists not only within medicine, but also within the law 
itself. Witness, for instance, the criticism by judges of the 
current legal standards for decision-making for incompetent 
patients. 
We attempted to devise a better way of deciding for these 
vulnerable patients by turning away from the ethics of rights, 
and toward the ethics of responsibility. In this new framework, 
we discovered a system which acknowledged that attachment is 
relevant to the domain of moral choice. The inclusion of 
attachment in moral discussions radically changed recommendations 
about how moral choices ought to be made. Thus, within the 
ethics of responsibilities, we do not emphasize negative 
freedoms, such as the freedom to be left alone, but look rather 
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to ways in which we may nurture the human capacities of members 
of the community. 
Within the ethics of responsibility, our obligation to 
respect other persons does not depend on autonomy alone, but also 
on the capacity for relation. Thus, we respect persons for 
whichever of these human capacities they maintain. Respect does 
not mean that autonomous and non-autonomous patients must be 
treated exactly alike. Respect requires us to discover those 
goals and means of treatment which respond to the patient's 
actual needs. The human dignity of dying, or severely ill, 
incompetent patients is not protected by assaulting them with 
technology, if such interventions offer no realistic hope of cure 
or remission. We show more respect for these patients by 
responding to their need for relation, i.e., by providing comfort 
and communication to them and to those who will be diminished by 
their loss. 
The ethics of responsibility provides us with standards 
which will lead us to make decisions that are principled and 
available for public review, yet flexible enough to respond to 
the needs and vulnerabilities of individuals. 
Physicians will not be able to aid families and patients in 
making such decisions if their notion of professional 
responsibility focuses solely on technical expertise. These 
difficult decisions, which are an integral part of the 
physician's work, demand that we go beyond the technical and into 
the realm of ethics. It is not to our credit, therefore, that so 
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little time is devoted to the teaching of ethics to "students" of 
medicine, regardless of their level of training. If physicians 
are dissatisfied with the way in which decisions are made for 
incompetent patients, it is not appropriate for them to blame the 
courts and the legal model. We must accept the responsibility as 
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